Metal music is about power. Power includes all grand epic thoughts, such as religion. Metal is more critical not of religion itself, but of its egalitarian ethos, which is anti-power.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) related to traditional knowledge (TK) have been controversial and there has been accusations of bio-piracy and unauthorized appropriation of TK in the form of patents etc. There were reports that patents on Yoga had been granted by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office but this was later denied. Patents on accessories, devices that enable practice and teaching of Yoga have been granted. Similarly there many trademarks related to Yoga have been granted. The copyright claims of the founder of Bikram Yoga have been controversial and the cases on these copyright claims have been settled out of court. Yoga with origins in India has become part of global consumer culture and has been transformed into what is called as ‘transnational yoga’. Hence it has many meanings in different contexts. This article addresses the controversies and discusses the complexities involved in intellectual property rights related to Yoga.

One of the reasons why I ask is because Smith only relays one anecdote to support his claim. In the full version of the essay he writes:

For example, in a recent Contemporary Sociology book review, the reviewer, a senior sociologist from an Ivy League university, chides a book author for not knowing enough about religion. The reviewer then asserts that the real ‘net effects of religion and faith’ operating ‘on a macro level’ are ‘a few thousand years of horrible wars, genocide, slavery’s ideology, sexual exploitation, torture, devaluing others as not human, terrorism, and organized hatred.’ That opinion is not uncommon—I frequently see and hear it expressed by sociologists.

With the assistance of Google I tracked down this book review and it appears he has taken the quote out of context. The quote is actually presented as a counterpoint to, but not an argument against, the notion that religious belief is a net benefit to human happiness because it “is a proxy for social interaction and sometimes a spur to useful and noble volunteer work.” What the reviewer was getting at by inserting the counterpoint is that “determining the net gain of religiosity to overall happiness is a remarkably difficult task.” But that’s not what I understood from Smith when I initially read his critique, which even suggests something remarkably similar to what the reviewer actually meant. Smith writes that the “truth about religions is complex and challenging. Historically and today, religion involves plenty of good and bad, light and darkness, splendor and evil to go around.” I couldn’t agree more with Smith about the fact that the quote he reproduced presents a caricature of religion, but what about his own out of context presentation of that quote?

If the answer to my first question is that the problem Smith identifies is as serious as he claims then it would behoove of us all to do a much better job addressing it than he has. The answer simply cannot be caricaturing and misrepresenting the work of others in order to bolster an argument which ironically is itself about not caricaturing and misrepresenting something else.

1. What’s the solution? Codification and the centralization of state power has been the dominant force in legal theory since the 1700s, and it seems like it’s going to stay that way for a while, and there seems to be no viable alternative.

I would also question whether this pluralism exists because Muslim jurists developed it this way, or because of the historical reality that it was impossible in Egypt for example to apply a unified law system in the outskirts of Cairo, much less in villages. I think that the justification given by many Islamist groups would be that today we can apply this Shari’a in a uniform fashion because we have the methods (technology, media, etc.) to do so.

2. Codification removes much of the diversity in legal opinions, yes, however codes can be interpreted by the judicial powers and codes can change just like anything else can as the interpretation of the text changes, albeit with much more difficultly than traditional case-by-case interpretations.

Also, returning to older interpretations for application in a later period was a common practice throughout the Sunni legal tradition and can be seen through any later text in a fiqh school. In Egyptian history, for example, throughout the Mamluk Period judicial references were commonly made to the rulings of Qadi Khan, even in non-Maliki courtrooms. The same would be done to Al Qaddouri, with a number of Shafi’ judges actively quoting him hundreds of years after his death.

And finally, there is on the other hand the common law system, never really applied in Muslim countries but something that seems closer to the past Islamic reality. Does this system have the same form of restrictions of pluralism or does its reliance on precedent and more judicial freedoms give the answers that are necessary?

We’re glad you both enjoyed the piece and thank you for these good questions. We are especially encouraged that you both are asking about the real-life implications (past and present) of Islamic legal pluralism. This is very much the direction we would like conversations about sharia to take, so we are happy to engage with a few more details here. A full answer is, of course, beyond the scope of this forum, but we offer the following as a beginning.

Mr. Casper asks about whether fiqh legal pluralism was actually recognized in real-life adjudication, given that many Muslim governments tended to favor a particular school. He suggests that this favoritism stifled (or, practically speaking, eliminated) the fiqh pluralism that otherwise existed in theory. Actually, it did not. While it is true that most Muslim governments had a favorite fiqh school, Muslim rulers nevertheless often appointed a variety of judges (belonging to different fiqh schools) corresponding to the schools most popular in each geographic location. It was also common for judges of the government’s favored school (and, granted, there were more of them than of the unflavored schools) to take judicial notice of fatwas (nonbinding legal opinions) from fiqh experts of other schools, usually presented by one of the parties as part of a request for adjudication according to that school. Judicial treatment of these requests were of course not uniform, but the important point is that it was considered relevant, and sometimes dispositive. In this sense, the reality of fiqh-pluralism was a bottom-up, versus a top-down, process. So, yes (using your terms), a citizen of X fiqh school could request an X-based ruling, even if the ruler favored Y fiqh school – either by the existence of a judge of school X for the X Muslim population residing in the area, or by presenting to a judge of school Y a fatwa based on school X. It is also important to realize that, while schools were largely geographically-organized, they were not exclusively so. There were many areas featuring Muslims of more than one school, especially some large cosmopolitan cities. Finally, it is important to note that there was not only pluralism across the different schools of fiqh jurisprudence, but also within those schools as well. Even if one fiqh school was dominant in a particular geographic area, there was considerable variability.)

Mr. Weisbard asks about the present – namely, how fiqh pluralism could work with the practical realities of legal and political systems today. This is a large focus of my (Asifa’s) current book project. It is a large topic with lots of room for different manifestations to take into account to the individual needs and realities of each country. Nevertheless, the argument that I will make is that the idea of individual-driven resolution of legal disputes according to fiqh schools is not one that is unworkable, or novel. This is true even in modern western countries. For example, the practice of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the United States is an example of a method by which legal disputes can be (and are) resolved by criteria other than the uniform law of the land. Modern Muslim governments could likewise allow a robust parallel legal realm through which individuals could consent to adjudication of their legal disputes according to a selected fiqh (or other religious) legal authority. You point out potential complications with legal relationships that cross-denominational or religious lines – like marriage. I imagine parties could avoid jurisdictional complications by, among other things, a choice-of-law clause in the initial contract similar to those used by international entities around the world today. There are, of course, complex legal questions where issues get messy between the lines, but overall, this is generally dealt with through creative crafting of legal and administrative rules, rather than rejecting choice-of-law clauses altogether. I will argue in future writings that the benefits of fiqh pluralism are, likewise, worth the effort.

Thanks again for a great discussion.

Asifa Quraishi-Landes and Tamir Moustafa