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	<title>Comments on: The new faces of the European far-right</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/05/11/the-european-far-right/</link>
	<description>Secularism, religion, and the public sphere</description>
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		<title>By: Yolande Jansen</title>
		<link>http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/05/11/the-european-far-right/comment-page-1/#comment-48915</link>
		<dc:creator>Yolande Jansen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2011 08:23:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/?p=23774#comment-48915</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[1. Göle gives a good insight in the transformation of the European far right, but she confines herself too much to a Western European context. In Central and Eastern Europe, the far right is not so much directed against Islam, but mostly against the Roma while also being anti-Semitic. It has led to a degree of violence against the Roma hitherto unknown in Western Europe against Muslims, with several of them killed, and many of them terrorized by extremist vigilantes. The far right Central and Eastern European parties have at least partly gone through similar transformations from the Western ones, as we can see when comparing the characteristics of Marine Le Pen with those of Krisztina Morvai and Gábor Vona, the most prominent Jobbik policitians. (Jobbik is the Hungarian far right party.) Morvai is a former human rights lawyer and a feminist, Vona studied history and psychology before entering politics: they at least partly display the same kind of &#039;hijacking of the culture of the left&#039; that the Western European far right is doing.   

Göle is not alone in her perhaps too exclusive focus on the Islamophobic side of the European far right. Göle refers to Rancière&#039;s analysis of contemporary state racism, in which he talks about the creation of a stereotype of undesirable subjects by &#039;the conflation among migrant, immigrant, reactionary, Islamist, male chauvinist and terrorist&#039;. Ironically, he pronounced these words at a meeting called &#039;Why the Roma?&#039; which was organised at the time of the eviction of Romani migrants from France back to Romania in September 2010. (For a view concentrated on the  Romaphobic side of Europe, see Europe’s Romaphobia; Problematization, Securitization, Nomadization, Environment and Planning D, 2011, by Huub van Baar.) 
 
It would be good to take a systematic comparative approach of the contemporary racisms against Roma and Muslims. That would help us, on the one hand, to question the focus on religion in thinking about the status of Muslims in Europe that the framing in terms of secularism (both for and against) has made us used to. A comparative approach could lead us to be talking more about state racism as a European tradition taking new forms (as Rancière reminds us), about new media and new processes of stereotyping, fear of poverty, fear of difference, the unforeseen side-effects of European minority governance, and on how to reclaim the history of humanist Europe for a pluralist left. Comparing the transformations and studying the intersections of the new far right in Western and in Central and Eastern Europe might also help us to see how far to the centre the far right movement has already gotten in a united Europe, and it would perhaps bring to light more prominently the inability---or even unwillingness, to think with Rancière---of the European left, conservative and Christian-democratic parties to find answers to these movements. 

2.  I mostly agree with Rogier van Reekum&#039;s reaction to Göle about Dutch multiculturalism, where he says that the &#039;rich Dutch multicultural heritage&#039; that Göle is talking about never existed. I think van Reekum&#039;s remark could be extended to the larger European context: in several European countries there is talk about a &#039;seismic shift&#039; from multicultural policies in the 80s and 90s to policies of &#039;civic integration&#039; around the turn of the millennium. (For example in France and Germany; and also Britain to a certain extent. See for a detailed account &#039;The Multiculturalism Backlash&#039;, eds. Steven Vertovec and Suzanne Wessendorf, Routledge 2010.) In all of these countries, policies were called multicultural, pluralist or respectful of difference in the nineties. Many of these policies were top-down, and bad at supporting the self-organisation of ethnic and religious minorities or their empowerment in the national and European contexts. But, and here I agree with Göle more than with van Reekum, the transformation that has taken place is not just a matter of the degree of the politicization of migration, and we shouldn&#039;t take the risk of bagatellising what is happening today: we only have to take a look at the Europe-wide spread of nationalist integration-tests, the cruel &#039;return&#039; policies for non-documented migrants and their children, the surge of verbal and sometimes even physical violence against minorities all over Europe, to have, perhaps, some nostalgia for the eighties and nineties, and most certainly to feel the need for an egalitarian and critical multiculturalism recovered for a European future.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1. Göle gives a good insight in the transformation of the European far right, but she confines herself too much to a Western European context. In Central and Eastern Europe, the far right is not so much directed against Islam, but mostly against the Roma while also being anti-Semitic. It has led to a degree of violence against the Roma hitherto unknown in Western Europe against Muslims, with several of them killed, and many of them terrorized by extremist vigilantes. The far right Central and Eastern European parties have at least partly gone through similar transformations from the Western ones, as we can see when comparing the characteristics of Marine Le Pen with those of Krisztina Morvai and Gábor Vona, the most prominent Jobbik policitians. (Jobbik is the Hungarian far right party.) Morvai is a former human rights lawyer and a feminist, Vona studied history and psychology before entering politics: they at least partly display the same kind of &#8216;hijacking of the culture of the left&#8217; that the Western European far right is doing.   </p>
<p>Göle is not alone in her perhaps too exclusive focus on the Islamophobic side of the European far right. Göle refers to Rancière&#8217;s analysis of contemporary state racism, in which he talks about the creation of a stereotype of undesirable subjects by &#8216;the conflation among migrant, immigrant, reactionary, Islamist, male chauvinist and terrorist&#8217;. Ironically, he pronounced these words at a meeting called &#8216;Why the Roma?&#8217; which was organised at the time of the eviction of Romani migrants from France back to Romania in September 2010. (For a view concentrated on the  Romaphobic side of Europe, see Europe’s Romaphobia; Problematization, Securitization, Nomadization, Environment and Planning D, 2011, by Huub van Baar.) </p>
<p>It would be good to take a systematic comparative approach of the contemporary racisms against Roma and Muslims. That would help us, on the one hand, to question the focus on religion in thinking about the status of Muslims in Europe that the framing in terms of secularism (both for and against) has made us used to. A comparative approach could lead us to be talking more about state racism as a European tradition taking new forms (as Rancière reminds us), about new media and new processes of stereotyping, fear of poverty, fear of difference, the unforeseen side-effects of European minority governance, and on how to reclaim the history of humanist Europe for a pluralist left. Comparing the transformations and studying the intersections of the new far right in Western and in Central and Eastern Europe might also help us to see how far to the centre the far right movement has already gotten in a united Europe, and it would perhaps bring to light more prominently the inability&#8212;or even unwillingness, to think with Rancière&#8212;of the European left, conservative and Christian-democratic parties to find answers to these movements. </p>
<p>2.  I mostly agree with Rogier van Reekum&#8217;s reaction to Göle about Dutch multiculturalism, where he says that the &#8216;rich Dutch multicultural heritage&#8217; that Göle is talking about never existed. I think van Reekum&#8217;s remark could be extended to the larger European context: in several European countries there is talk about a &#8216;seismic shift&#8217; from multicultural policies in the 80s and 90s to policies of &#8216;civic integration&#8217; around the turn of the millennium. (For example in France and Germany; and also Britain to a certain extent. See for a detailed account &#8216;The Multiculturalism Backlash&#8217;, eds. Steven Vertovec and Suzanne Wessendorf, Routledge 2010.) In all of these countries, policies were called multicultural, pluralist or respectful of difference in the nineties. Many of these policies were top-down, and bad at supporting the self-organisation of ethnic and religious minorities or their empowerment in the national and European contexts. But, and here I agree with Göle more than with van Reekum, the transformation that has taken place is not just a matter of the degree of the politicization of migration, and we shouldn&#8217;t take the risk of bagatellising what is happening today: we only have to take a look at the Europe-wide spread of nationalist integration-tests, the cruel &#8216;return&#8217; policies for non-documented migrants and their children, the surge of verbal and sometimes even physical violence against minorities all over Europe, to have, perhaps, some nostalgia for the eighties and nineties, and most certainly to feel the need for an egalitarian and critical multiculturalism recovered for a European future.</p>
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		<title>By: Carmen</title>
		<link>http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/05/11/the-european-far-right/comment-page-1/#comment-48777</link>
		<dc:creator>Carmen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 May 2011 17:14:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/?p=23774#comment-48777</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I would like to add two thoughts based on observations and conversations from my few interactions with members of a number of &#039;Bürgerinitiativen&#039; (citizens&#039; initiatives) against what they perceive as the growing threat of Islam to Europe in form of mosques and Islamic clothing like different forms of veils in public spaces in Germany:

Some of the people I talked to have their political roots in the Green party and ascribe themselves to the generation of &#039;68. They also largely subscribe to their principles, however, see exactly these principles threatened by the lack of contestation of Muslim influence in the Green party. They harshly criticize Cem Özdemir, co-chairman of the party and son of Turkish migrants, for his so called lenience vis-à-vis Muslims and the &#039;devastating influence&#039; of Muslim organizations. Geert Wilders and the PVV are their role models. It is an interesting and worrying amalgam in which the &#039;68 generation and the green movement also play an ambiguous role. 

The role of gender and gender relations is fascinating: two men related independently to me how, in their youth, they were in love with a woman from a Muslim family. The response was in both cases negative, which they ascribed to them being Muslims and therefore could date a non-Muslim. Leaving aside the question whether these stories are true or not, I find it quite intriguing that it did not occur to those two men, who support feminism as they say, that maybe the women just did not want to date them for whatever reason of their own. The &#039;availability&#039; of Muslim women to non-Muslims seems to be a major concern and a litmus test for women&#039;s liberation.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I would like to add two thoughts based on observations and conversations from my few interactions with members of a number of &#8216;Bürgerinitiativen&#8217; (citizens&#8217; initiatives) against what they perceive as the growing threat of Islam to Europe in form of mosques and Islamic clothing like different forms of veils in public spaces in Germany:</p>
<p>Some of the people I talked to have their political roots in the Green party and ascribe themselves to the generation of &#8217;68. They also largely subscribe to their principles, however, see exactly these principles threatened by the lack of contestation of Muslim influence in the Green party. They harshly criticize Cem Özdemir, co-chairman of the party and son of Turkish migrants, for his so called lenience vis-à-vis Muslims and the &#8216;devastating influence&#8217; of Muslim organizations. Geert Wilders and the PVV are their role models. It is an interesting and worrying amalgam in which the &#8217;68 generation and the green movement also play an ambiguous role. </p>
<p>The role of gender and gender relations is fascinating: two men related independently to me how, in their youth, they were in love with a woman from a Muslim family. The response was in both cases negative, which they ascribed to them being Muslims and therefore could date a non-Muslim. Leaving aside the question whether these stories are true or not, I find it quite intriguing that it did not occur to those two men, who support feminism as they say, that maybe the women just did not want to date them for whatever reason of their own. The &#8216;availability&#8217; of Muslim women to non-Muslims seems to be a major concern and a litmus test for women&#8217;s liberation.</p>
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		<title>By: Rogier van Reekum</title>
		<link>http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/05/11/the-european-far-right/comment-page-1/#comment-48708</link>
		<dc:creator>Rogier van Reekum</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 May 2011 08:04:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/?p=23774#comment-48708</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This post gives a good and multifaceted view of what is happening in Europe. Yet I would like to make two remarks:

1. Göle reiterates the idea that the Netherlands is losing a &quot;rich multicultural heritage&quot;. But to lose such a heritage the Netherlands would have to have had one in the first place. This is not the case. There was some governmental lip-service to &quot;retaining the identity of newcomers&quot; (1979-1989) and of course an embrace of the idea (yet not always the practice) of anti-racism. In terms of policy there were a few, often inconsequential provisions for &quot;minorities&quot; which were always already put in place in order to speed up the integration of cultural others into the national fold. This has been changing already since 1989.

2. Related to the first point I think we should watch out not to fall into a kind of nostalgia for a time before these new movements came up (not that Göle is doing that here!). As my first point suggests: things weren&#039;t much better in the 70s, 80s or 90s. They were just a bit less politicized. Anti-immigrant movements lacked the organizational strength, the media platforms and the right kind of rhetorical mix in order to capitalize on the always already existing anxieties of the electorate and the nativist logic of the nation-state as such. The recent politicization of migration and difference are certainly not an improvement, but they do not represent a retreat from a more felicitous situation either. On the brighter side, the issue of migration is one of the focal point around which---maybe, finally---a European public sphere can amalgamate.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post gives a good and multifaceted view of what is happening in Europe. Yet I would like to make two remarks:</p>
<p>1. Göle reiterates the idea that the Netherlands is losing a &#8220;rich multicultural heritage&#8221;. But to lose such a heritage the Netherlands would have to have had one in the first place. This is not the case. There was some governmental lip-service to &#8220;retaining the identity of newcomers&#8221; (1979-1989) and of course an embrace of the idea (yet not always the practice) of anti-racism. In terms of policy there were a few, often inconsequential provisions for &#8220;minorities&#8221; which were always already put in place in order to speed up the integration of cultural others into the national fold. This has been changing already since 1989.</p>
<p>2. Related to the first point I think we should watch out not to fall into a kind of nostalgia for a time before these new movements came up (not that Göle is doing that here!). As my first point suggests: things weren&#8217;t much better in the 70s, 80s or 90s. They were just a bit less politicized. Anti-immigrant movements lacked the organizational strength, the media platforms and the right kind of rhetorical mix in order to capitalize on the always already existing anxieties of the electorate and the nativist logic of the nation-state as such. The recent politicization of migration and difference are certainly not an improvement, but they do not represent a retreat from a more felicitous situation either. On the brighter side, the issue of migration is one of the focal point around which&#8212;maybe, finally&#8212;a European public sphere can amalgamate.</p>
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		<title>By: Ali Altaf Mian</title>
		<link>http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/05/11/the-european-far-right/comment-page-1/#comment-48694</link>
		<dc:creator>Ali Altaf Mian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 May 2011 22:16:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/?p=23774#comment-48694</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The cultural and political future of Europe looks quite gloomy from Nilüfer Göle’s pointed and persuasive analyses. However, I do think that the concepts of “state” and “nation” need to be separated, especially when we look for possible “solutions” to political problems that are being caused by this new brand of pan-European nationalism. It is true that belonging to a national identity is relative to particular contexts, but what Göle articulates so effectively here is the formation of a pan-European idea of “the nation” and national sentiment that is constituted almost exclusively by a common (mis)reading and (mis)representation of “Islam” and Muslims. In this way, the “nation” has become the driving force in both “public popularity” and “political engagement.” Unfortunately, this is not only true for the likes of Marine Le Pen, but also for critical theorists such as Julia Kristeva, who had identified as politically problematic and ethically reprehensible both the rationalist-nationalist contractual and the feudal-spiritualistic identitarian models of the nation-state (see Kristeva’s &lt;em&gt;Strangers to Ourselves&lt;/em&gt;). However, in her recent work Kristeva has insisted on the category of the nation as the site where one redresses political and cultural problems of the stranger and the foreigner; she writes, “First of all, I believe that in order to fight the state of national depression that we are experiencing in France (but not only in France) as a result of globalization and the influx of immigrants, and also in order to oppose maniacal reactions to this depression (such as that of the Front National), it is important to restore national confidence” (&lt;em&gt;Hatred and Forgiveness&lt;/em&gt;, 13). One wonders what happened to the Kristeva who had prophetically announced: “Uncanny, foreignness is within us: we are our own foreigners, we are divided” (&lt;em&gt;Strangers to Ourselves&lt;/em&gt;, 181). In my view, the real problem is the unexamined unethical restoration of the “nation” in the political functioning of the state and society in general. I would think that any possible solution lies in disarticulating and struggling against the nation’s absolutist appropriation of the state.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The cultural and political future of Europe looks quite gloomy from Nilüfer Göle’s pointed and persuasive analyses. However, I do think that the concepts of “state” and “nation” need to be separated, especially when we look for possible “solutions” to political problems that are being caused by this new brand of pan-European nationalism. It is true that belonging to a national identity is relative to particular contexts, but what Göle articulates so effectively here is the formation of a pan-European idea of “the nation” and national sentiment that is constituted almost exclusively by a common (mis)reading and (mis)representation of “Islam” and Muslims. In this way, the “nation” has become the driving force in both “public popularity” and “political engagement.” Unfortunately, this is not only true for the likes of Marine Le Pen, but also for critical theorists such as Julia Kristeva, who had identified as politically problematic and ethically reprehensible both the rationalist-nationalist contractual and the feudal-spiritualistic identitarian models of the nation-state (see Kristeva’s <em>Strangers to Ourselves</em>). However, in her recent work Kristeva has insisted on the category of the nation as the site where one redresses political and cultural problems of the stranger and the foreigner; she writes, “First of all, I believe that in order to fight the state of national depression that we are experiencing in France (but not only in France) as a result of globalization and the influx of immigrants, and also in order to oppose maniacal reactions to this depression (such as that of the Front National), it is important to restore national confidence” (<em>Hatred and Forgiveness</em>, 13). One wonders what happened to the Kristeva who had prophetically announced: “Uncanny, foreignness is within us: we are our own foreigners, we are divided” (<em>Strangers to Ourselves</em>, 181). In my view, the real problem is the unexamined unethical restoration of the “nation” in the political functioning of the state and society in general. I would think that any possible solution lies in disarticulating and struggling against the nation’s absolutist appropriation of the state.</p>
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