http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/12/21/heraclitean-spirituality-ephemeral-selves/ Secularism, religion, and the public sphere Sat, 21 Nov 2009 03:44:04 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/12/21/heraclitean-spirituality-ephemeral-selves/comment-page-1/#comment-5421 Luc Perkins Wed, 14 Jan 2009 18:31:04 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/?p=1037#comment-5421 I wonder if Nietzsche goes wrong in many ways precisely because he betrays Heraclitus (contrary to the usual reading of Nietzsche). I read the Eternal Return in precisely this fashion: Nietzsche infinitizes the cyclical progression of the world, derives repetition from this, and then uses this as a spur to our transcendence vis-a-vis the shifting, ever-changing world. This transcendence is of course what Nietzsche calls affirmation ("Bejahung," saying yes), an affirmation that is impossible if we remain firmly within a Heraclitean framework. For Heraclitus, I take the aphorism about the river/self to mean that the world and the self too pass away---forever. If this is the case, the great heights, the super-humanity to which Nietzsche calls us seems impossible. The thought that we have to live our lives an infinite number of times---the SAME life---is intended to produce that Dionysian fire in us. When the thought of the Eternal Return resonates within us, we behold our entire future differently. We cannot but want to seize the future, to squeeze the marrow out of it. Heraclitus seems to call upon us to accept the fact of desire, of want, of suffering, and a kind of affirmation that doesn't require the Eternal Return. But Nietzsche insists on taking us a step further, calling upon a Savior to emerge (that savior being the one who accepts the Eternal Return, not the river image) and for the rest of us to either rise or fall faster (as in Zarathustra). Such a distinction doesn't seem to exist for Heraclitus, who seems to think that we can appreciate the rich endlessness of the logos as it is. Heidegger doesn't say it explicitly, but I think that he might agree that this is precisely what makes Nietzsche the "last metaphysician:" even he had to rebel against Zeitlichkeit in a profound way. I wonder if Nietzsche goes wrong in many ways precisely because he betrays Heraclitus (contrary to the usual reading of Nietzsche). I read the Eternal Return in precisely this fashion: Nietzsche infinitizes the cyclical progression of the world, derives repetition from this, and then uses this as a spur to our transcendence vis-a-vis the shifting, ever-changing world. This transcendence is of course what Nietzsche calls affirmation (”Bejahung,” saying yes), an affirmation that is impossible if we remain firmly within a Heraclitean framework. For Heraclitus, I take the aphorism about the river/self to mean that the world and the self too pass away—forever. If this is the case, the great heights, the super-humanity to which Nietzsche calls us seems impossible. The thought that we have to live our lives an infinite number of times—the SAME life—is intended to produce that Dionysian fire in us. When the thought of the Eternal Return resonates within us, we behold our entire future differently. We cannot but want to seize the future, to squeeze the marrow out of it. Heraclitus seems to call upon us to accept the fact of desire, of want, of suffering, and a kind of affirmation that doesn’t require the Eternal Return. But Nietzsche insists on taking us a step further, calling upon a Savior to emerge (that savior being the one who accepts the Eternal Return, not the river image) and for the rest of us to either rise or fall faster (as in Zarathustra). Such a distinction doesn’t seem to exist for Heraclitus, who seems to think that we can appreciate the rich endlessness of the logos as it is. Heidegger doesn’t say it explicitly, but I think that he might agree that this is precisely what makes Nietzsche the “last metaphysician:” even he had to rebel against Zeitlichkeit in a profound way.

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