Comments on: Let’s get clear about materialism

By: Robert Shepherd

Robert Shepherd — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 06:16:07 +0000

Mr. Slingerland has done a great service in pointing out the tendency on the part of journalists to suggest that evidence of neural correlates of religious experience is evidence of the truth of religious ideas. Of course, what would be truly astonishing would be discovery of religious experience with no neural correlates–such a discovery would turn EVERYTHING we think we know upside down. I am not suggesting that ultimately we shall arrive at completely physicalist explanations of all phenomena, by the way, because the hard problem IS hard and we have a tendency to overestimate our state of knowledge. At present, however, nonphysicalist explanations of the problem are highly speculative. The proper scientific approach is to do observations with the potential to falsify hypotheses, so there are some hypotheses that cannot, at present, be studied scientifically because we have arrived at no means by which to conduct observations with the potential to falsify them. Several of the commentators here seem to have, uncharitably, failed to remember that. Unfalsifiable speculation that is nonetheless consistent with what we know is a great deal of fun, and it can be productive, but it’s not science until the means to test and potentially falsify are established. It’s important for us all to remember that we are profoundly ignorant. Some day, we may have understandings that profoundly alter what we think about free will, the hard problem, physicalism, etc. Until then, why can’t we just agree that on many matters we are doubtless as ignorant as those ancients who thought that the stars were stuck into a dome like plums in a pudding? Why can’t we just say, I see this little area illuminated by the lantern I hold, and I hear some tantalizing noises from out of the darkness, but I haven’t really a clue what’s out there? And, of course, to the dismay of that truly brilliant man, Daniel Dennett, philosophers will continue to have fun speculating about that darkness, which is fine, I think, as long as people realize that they are illuminating the darkness with moonshine.

By: Andrew Nelson

Andrew Nelson — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 19:57:42 +0000

Hmm… while this article was obviously coming from a materialist perspective, it does not seem to have made any strong claims about materialism except that it has not been DIS-proven by recent neuroscience. Many of the commentators thus far seem to have over-reacted to the article’s content.

As for Nick Smyth: while I certainly don’t support any “hyper-reductionist physicalism,” suggesting that said position ISN’T a “coherent doctrine” is inflammatory and would need defending. Also, the intent of the article doesn’t seem to actually be concerned with clarifying the position of materialism – I’m not certain that a definition of materialism would have been necessary. Typically one can write about things people have said about Christianity without needing to give a definition of Christianity. Here the author clearly seems concerned with metaphysical materialism, and the author need only be as precise in his terms as the topic demands. At most he distinguishes between materialism in the metaphysical sense and materialism in the (very non-technical) ethical sense, which is not at all unprecedented or mystifying.

At any rate, complaining about the author’s “bias” reveals some poor misconceptions among those who have responded, for there is no such thing as an “objective” belief—but I suppose I will be accused of my bias for authors such as MacIntyre and Nietzsche when I say so….

By: Adam Frank

Adam Frank — Thu, 21 Aug 2008 15:31:05 +0000

It is an overstatement, to say the least, to claim that “the materialist conception of the person—which, pace Brooks, is in fact the consensus coming out of modern cognitive science.” First, many cognitive scientists start the game with this “consensus” established a priori as an explicit research program just as physicists begin with the assumption of a grand unification. Its not open to question. Secondly, there are more than enough cognitive scientists who recognize the ever spiraling difficulty of the so-called “hard problem.” Your bias is evident, and you are hiding it as science just, perhaps, as Brooks did.

By: Robin Leslie

Robin Leslie — Wed, 20 Aug 2008 10:18:25 +0000

The mistake in materialist theories is that they reduce the mind to the brain, and as a result these theorists become very quickly “brain-dead,” viz. they cannot think outside “the box.” Even if we knew what “brain states” or “mental states” were (and these two are not identical), we could infer very little from this about the whole person, simply because the person is a mystery about whom only the surface can be rationally apprised. Unless knowledge of the “depths” of the human person is known, and unless we are already aware of and living within the mystical, claims about brain-states are groundless.

By: Nathan Schneider

Nathan Schneider — Fri, 08 Aug 2008 03:23:38 +0000

This post was picked up at 3QuarksDaily, a popular filter blog. A lively conversation has sprung up about it there, which we invite you to visit: Getting Clear about Materialism.

By: Nick Smyth

Nick Smyth — Thu, 07 Aug 2008 18:54:09 +0000

One might think that an article called “Let’s get clear about materialism” might feature a definition of materialism. I can’t help but think that getting clear on this might have helped the author to refrain from making several bizarre suggestions, such as that materialism has been *empirically* verified or that hyper-reductionist physicalism is a coherent doctrine.

By: Jon Winsor

Jon Winsor — Sat, 02 Aug 2008 01:07:21 +0000

About the "squishy" part. This Brooks quote is from a Pew panel, which might help clarify what he meant (I am not endorsing his ideas, which I don't feel qualified to evaluate, just pointing them out).

By: Jon Winsor

Jon Winsor — Sat, 02 Aug 2008 00:37:36 +0000

Interesting quote from the Dalai Lama:

I said to one of the scientists: “It seems very evident that due to changes in the chemical process of the brain, many of our own subjective experiences like perception and sensation occur: Can one envision the reversal of this causal process? Can one postulate that pure thought itself could effect a change in the chemical process of the brain?” I was asking whether, conceptually at least, we could allow the possibility of both upward and downward causation.

The scientist’s response was quite surprising. He said that since all mental states arise from physical states, it is not possible for downward causation to occur. Although, out of politeness, I did not respond at the time, I thought then and still think that there is yet no scientific basis for such a categorical claim. The view that all mental processes are necessarily physical processes is a metaphysical assumption, not a scientific fact. I feel that, in the spirit of scientific inquiry, it is critical that we allow the question to remain open, and not conflate our assumptions with empirical fact.”

–From The Universe in a Single Atom