Comments for Making Sense of Darfur http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur Fri, 20 Nov 2009 10:36:10 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 Comment on Is Darfur the First Thuraya War? by johnf http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/08/is-darfur-the-first-thuraya-war/comment-page-1/#comment-5116 johnf Fri, 20 Nov 2009 10:36:10 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1389#comment-5116 Another interesting example of the democratizing, fissipating influence of mobile phones is with the PCC in Brazil, the prison gang who successfully took on the Brazilian Government in 2006. The social blueprint they initiated spread quickly through other prisons and the favelas. They communicated through conference calls with other "leaders" around the country, who in turn communicated through conference calls with those below them. Progress could only be achieved, agreement reached, through politeness, bargaining, well-thought out arguing. Nothing could be enforced from the top, so its structure came to be cell-like, the "leadership" leading through influence and intelligence. An amusing sidelight of it that reflects on the role of modern global capitalism - and its contradictions - was that the police could not take down the masts outside the prisons through which the PCC communicated because the Brazilian elite fervently believed in the sacred tenets of globalism and taking down the masts would result in lower profits for them. Their likewise sacred refusal to pay taxes resulted in underpaid government employees being willing to sell sensitive information to the PCC, including the secret telephone numbers of the elite and their families. One of the PCC's most lucrative sidelines is kidnapping. William Langwische chronicles all this in his excellent article: http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/langewiesche200704 Another interesting example of the democratizing, fissipating influence of mobile phones is with the PCC in Brazil, the prison gang who successfully took on the Brazilian Government in 2006.

The social blueprint they initiated spread quickly through other prisons and the favelas. They communicated through conference calls with other “leaders” around the country, who in turn communicated through conference calls with those below them.

Progress could only be achieved, agreement reached, through politeness, bargaining, well-thought out arguing. Nothing could be enforced from the top, so its structure came to be cell-like, the “leadership” leading through influence and intelligence.

An amusing sidelight of it that reflects on the role of modern global capitalism – and its contradictions – was that the police could not take down the masts outside the prisons through which the PCC communicated because the Brazilian elite fervently believed in the sacred tenets of globalism and taking down the masts would result in lower profits for them. Their likewise sacred refusal to pay taxes resulted in underpaid government employees being willing to sell sensitive information to the PCC, including the secret telephone numbers of the elite and their families. One of the PCC’s most lucrative sidelines is kidnapping.

William Langwische chronicles all this in his excellent article:

http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/langewiesche200704

]]> Comment on Of Lions and Mice in Darfur by Steve Fake http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/11/of-lions-and-mice-in-darfur/comment-page-1/#comment-5110 Steve Fake Thu, 19 Nov 2009 16:36:30 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1404#comment-5110 In his review, David Lanz raises the issue of "double standards" in our book. However, the book does not pretend to offer a systematic overview of the global response to Darfur. It was written as a work of advocacy grounded in scholarship. Lanz is quite right to note that "most Arab countries have remained largely silent on Darfur, while publicly denouncing the plight of Muslims elsewhere, from Bosnia to Palestine and Kashmir." This response from the elite classes in much of the Arab and Muslim world is as predictable as it is shameful. Readers of this blog are no doubt well aware of the sense of betrayal Darfuris have expressed in this regard. In fact, the response is the mirror image of the Western response. Mass slaughters are highlighted or ignored in accord with their political usefulness. It is no doubt of some academic interest to document the hypocrisy of the Arab political classes on Darfur and of considerable importance for activists in that part of the world. As for ourselves, we are neither well placed to perform such a task nor in a position to effectively advocate around the issue. Lanz calls us "excessively anti-American" for calling on Washington to pay reparations for past crimes in Sudan (namely the al-Shifa pharmaceutical attack and the crucial support provided to Nimeiri during his war against the south of Sudan). We have little to add on the merits of reparations but would like to note that the notion of anti-Americanism is an odd one and best abandoned in our opinion. For the term to mean what it implies, it must indicate an antipathy towards not just the government but its people, land, cultures, etc. Perhaps there were many Germans during the first World War who were truly anti-American, just as there was certainly a genuine anti-German sentiment in the U.S. at the time. But outside of such contexts, it seems an abuse of the word to apply it. The Australian journalist John Pilger recounts in his book Heroes (pg 511) of being accused by the then-U.S. ambassador to Britain of making an “anti-American” documentary because his film interviewed American GIs in Vietnam and documented their low morale. As Pilger points out, the film featured the plight of the soldiers sympathetically, so it’s unclear which Americans it was anti. The government is the country and the population is irrelevant, by this way of thinking. In a similar manner, it is almost as nonsensical to refer to divestment movements against Sudan and Israel as "anti-Sudan" and "anti-Israel," as Marc Perelman does in Forward (http://www.forward.com/articles/3667/). A Bloomberg article (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aDBiT.cG_7Rw&refer=columnist_wasik) also identifies divestment activists as "anti-Sudan". Lanz criticizes the book for overlooking “the helpful contributions of the U.S. in ending the North-South conflict.” This may be a fair point, though elsewhere we have noted Washington’s useful role in reaching the CPA. For instance, in the April issue of In These Times magazine, we noted that the CPA “was concluded after neighboring countries and key foreign powers—notably the United States—made a push for peace and facilitated negotiations” and quoted a former Sudanese ambassador who said that the CPA “would have not been achieved without such concerted Western pressure on both sides.” Lanz believes our work "downplays Sudanese agency and exaggerates U.S. influence in Sudan." Much as we write with an eye towards the West, and American activists in particular, we focus on those areas in which our expected readership can have an impact. Unquestionably, primary agency for the Darfur crisis lies with Khartoum, followed by Beijing. If we do not devote much space to fleshing out the details of their villainy, it is because we very consciously chose to look at a distinct issue. Indeed, part of the critique of the Save Darfur establishment in our book is centered on the oddity of U.S. activists focusing on a conflict over which their government has relatively little influence. Lanz raises an interesting point in asserting that “Darfur is not a convincing example of Western imperialism and in many ways contradicts leftist analysis of international affairs. If... the US government in Sudan was primarily motivated by oil interests, counter-terrorism and geostrategic competition with China, would it not make sense for the U.S. to foster a good relationship with Sudan, similar to, say, Saudi Arabia? ... The most important reason for the strained relations is that US interests in Sudan are more humanitarian than geostrategic” due to the influence of domestic lobbies. In response to Lanz, we might ask what Washington's policies towards Sudan would look like in the absence of any advocacy groups. It is possible that these groups have restrained Washington from moving more openly towards an embrace of Khartoum. However, the principle issue originally was one of disobedience. Khartoum moved out of Washington's orbit and sided with Iraq in the '91 Gulf War. To this day, there is every indication that Khartoum would love to get Western oil companies to invest in Sudan, but less clarity that it would be a loyal client. This at any rate is the publicly stated perception of Khartoum. Bashir recently explained that Sudan is too "independent" for Washington's liking (I’m afraid I don’t have a link handy but can dig it up if there’s interest). While this view is self-serving coming from Bashir, it is quite plausible. Lanz sees a "tension in left-wing thinking between anti-imperialism and human rights, as highlighted by Richard Just in his review of Mamdani’s and Garth Evans’ recent books." This "tension" is more apparent than real. In terms of first principles, human rights clearly precedes anti-imerialism. But we might ask how often they really conflict. Once propaganda and mythology are put aside, very few acts of war stand up to scrutiny for their humanitarian impact. In our book we cite the only case we are aware of (certainly in the modern era) in which a military intervention by Washington had a positive impact on human rights: that of Haiti in '94. The most serious instances of interventions with humanitarian consequences (India in Bangladesh; Vietnam in Cambodia; Tanzania in Uganda) were not undertaken by the biggest powers. Lanz holds that we see "all conflict intervention as a western conspiracy to undermine Africa.” We would respond that the word “conspiracy” is inappropriate, as the interests of major powers are self-evident and flow naturally from the nature of contemporary international power imbalances. No one in the West speaks of a Chinese conspiracy to pursue its interests in Africa – because self-interested motivations are taken for granted. Lanz also questions our assertion that the UN-AU force in Darfur “operates under significant Western influence, and thus will ultimately serve a humanitarian agenda only insofar as it serves an imperial one.” He comments, “It is funny then that there are no lions, but only mice among UNAMID troops." Strange at a glance perhaps but ultimately quite explicable – why send in the marines when cops on the beat will do? Western forces and the political costs associated with domestic fatalities are reserved for only the most imperative situations. However, the quote Lanz uses from our book does deserve elaboration. As a sort of truism, one we share with Lanz - who believes that we are “far from” a situation in which "the US or any other government is inherently humanitarian" - governments act in their own perceived interests - not least the big powers. This does not mean that their actions are always harmful, sometimes the incidental consequences are beneficial. In the book we review numerous UN interventions in Africa and conclude that (particularly in cases were major powers were indiferent to the conflict in question), the (almost always underresourced) UN peacekeepers were often able to have a modest positive impact. Such peacekeeping operations are funded to varying degrees by the West - who axiomatically perceive some interest in doing so. We may infer that peacekeeping is seen as an inexpensive way to maintain some minimal level of regional stability - an important thing for those who are troubled by matters such as unstable investment climates and unpredictable political dynamics. The most pervasive ideology in the West is surely that of Western governmental benevolence – of purity of motives. In writing the book, we have attempted to put forward an analysis free of ideological blinders, though no doubt many will see in it the opposite. In his review, David Lanz raises the issue of “double standards” in our book. However, the book does not pretend to offer a systematic overview of the global response to Darfur. It was written as a work of advocacy grounded in scholarship. Lanz is quite right to note that “most Arab countries have remained largely silent on Darfur, while publicly denouncing the plight of Muslims elsewhere, from Bosnia to Palestine and Kashmir.” This response from the elite classes in much of the Arab and Muslim world is as predictable as it is shameful. Readers of this blog are no doubt well aware of the sense of betrayal Darfuris have expressed in this regard. In fact, the response is the mirror image of the Western response. Mass slaughters are highlighted or ignored in accord with their political usefulness. It is no doubt of some academic interest to document the hypocrisy of the Arab political classes on Darfur and of considerable importance for activists in that part of the world. As for ourselves, we are neither well placed to perform such a task nor in a position to effectively advocate around the issue.

Lanz calls us “excessively anti-American” for calling on Washington to pay reparations for past crimes in Sudan (namely the al-Shifa pharmaceutical attack and the crucial support provided to Nimeiri during his war against the south of Sudan). We have little to add on the merits of reparations but would like to note that the notion of anti-Americanism is an odd one and best abandoned in our opinion. For the term to mean what it implies, it must indicate an antipathy towards not just the government but its people, land, cultures, etc. Perhaps there were many Germans during the first World War who were truly anti-American, just as there was certainly a genuine anti-German sentiment in the U.S. at the time. But outside of such contexts, it seems an abuse of the word to apply it. The Australian journalist John Pilger recounts in his book Heroes (pg 511) of being accused by the then-U.S. ambassador to Britain of making an “anti-American” documentary because his film interviewed American GIs in Vietnam and documented their low morale. As Pilger points out, the film featured the plight of the soldiers sympathetically, so it’s unclear which Americans it was anti. The government is the country and the population is irrelevant, by this way of thinking. In a similar manner, it is almost as nonsensical to refer to divestment movements against Sudan and Israel as “anti-Sudan” and “anti-Israel,” as Marc Perelman does in Forward (http://www.forward.com/articles/3667/). A Bloomberg article (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aDBiT.cG_7Rw&refer=columnist_wasik) also identifies divestment activists as “anti-Sudan”.

Lanz criticizes the book for overlooking “the helpful contributions of the U.S. in ending the North-South conflict.” This may be a fair point, though elsewhere we have noted Washington’s useful role in reaching the CPA. For instance, in the April issue of In These Times magazine, we noted that the CPA “was concluded after neighboring countries and key foreign powers—notably the United States—made a push for peace and facilitated negotiations” and quoted a former Sudanese ambassador who said that the CPA “would have not been achieved without such concerted Western pressure on both sides.”

Lanz believes our work “downplays Sudanese agency and exaggerates U.S. influence in Sudan.” Much as we write with an eye towards the West, and American activists in particular, we focus on those areas in which our expected readership can have an impact. Unquestionably, primary agency for the Darfur crisis lies with Khartoum, followed by Beijing. If we do not devote much space to fleshing out the details of their villainy, it is because we very consciously chose to look at a distinct issue. Indeed, part of the critique of the Save Darfur establishment in our book is centered on the oddity of U.S. activists focusing on a conflict over which their government has relatively little influence.

Lanz raises an interesting point in asserting that “Darfur is not a convincing example of Western imperialism and in many ways contradicts leftist analysis of international affairs. If… the US government in Sudan was primarily motivated by oil interests, counter-terrorism and geostrategic competition with China, would it not make sense for the U.S. to foster a good relationship with Sudan, similar to, say, Saudi Arabia? … The most important reason for the strained relations is that US interests in Sudan are more humanitarian than geostrategic” due to the influence of domestic lobbies. In response to Lanz, we might ask what Washington’s policies towards Sudan would look like in the absence of any advocacy groups. It is possible that these groups have restrained Washington from moving more openly towards an embrace of Khartoum. However, the principle issue originally was one of disobedience. Khartoum moved out of Washington’s orbit and sided with Iraq in the ‘91 Gulf War. To this day, there is every indication that Khartoum would love to get Western oil companies to invest in Sudan, but less clarity that it would be a loyal client. This at any rate is the publicly stated perception of Khartoum. Bashir recently explained that Sudan is too “independent” for Washington’s liking (I’m afraid I don’t have a link handy but can dig it up if there’s interest). While this view is self-serving coming from Bashir, it is quite plausible.

Lanz sees a “tension in left-wing thinking between anti-imperialism and human rights, as highlighted by Richard Just in his review of Mamdani’s and Garth Evans’ recent books.” This “tension” is more apparent than real. In terms of first principles, human rights clearly precedes anti-imerialism. But we might ask how often they really conflict. Once propaganda and mythology are put aside, very few acts of war stand up to scrutiny for their humanitarian impact. In our book we cite the only case we are aware of (certainly in the modern era) in which a military intervention by Washington had a positive impact on human rights: that of Haiti in ‘94. The most serious instances of interventions with humanitarian consequences (India in Bangladesh; Vietnam in Cambodia; Tanzania in Uganda) were not undertaken by the biggest powers.

Lanz holds that we see “all conflict intervention as a western conspiracy to undermine Africa.” We would respond that the word “conspiracy” is inappropriate, as the interests of major powers are self-evident and flow naturally from the nature of contemporary international power imbalances. No one in the West speaks of a Chinese conspiracy to pursue its interests in Africa – because self-interested motivations are taken for granted.

Lanz also questions our assertion that the UN-AU force in Darfur “operates under significant Western influence, and thus will ultimately serve a humanitarian agenda only insofar as it serves an imperial one.” He comments, “It is funny then that there are no lions, but only mice among UNAMID troops.” Strange at a glance perhaps but ultimately quite explicable – why send in the marines when cops on the beat will do? Western forces and the political costs associated with domestic fatalities are reserved for only the most imperative situations. However, the quote Lanz uses from our book does deserve elaboration. As a sort of truism, one we share with Lanz – who believes that we are “far from” a situation in which “the US or any other government is inherently humanitarian” – governments act in their own perceived interests – not least the big powers. This does not mean that their actions are always harmful, sometimes the incidental consequences are beneficial. In the book we review numerous UN interventions in Africa and conclude that (particularly in cases were major powers were indiferent to the conflict in question), the (almost always underresourced) UN peacekeepers were often able to have a modest positive impact. Such peacekeeping operations are funded to varying degrees by the West – who axiomatically perceive some interest in doing so. We may infer that peacekeeping is seen as an inexpensive way to maintain some minimal level of regional stability – an important thing for those who are troubled by matters such as unstable investment climates and unpredictable political dynamics.

The most pervasive ideology in the West is surely that of Western governmental benevolence – of purity of motives. In writing the book, we have attempted to put forward an analysis free of ideological blinders, though no doubt many will see in it the opposite.

]]> Comment on South Sudan Should Make Freedom of Expression a Priority by Hakim Moi http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/17/south-sudan-should-make-freedom-of-expression-a-priority/comment-page-1/#comment-5108 Hakim Moi Thu, 19 Nov 2009 14:20:24 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1434#comment-5108 Dear David, The current pieces of media legislation draft bills before the parliament in Juba is an attempt to implement the very principles of the CPA and democratic transformation as stipulated in the National Interim Constitution and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS), the Bill of Rights which provides for freedom of expression, etc. So it's not like attempting to jump the gun, and the work leading up to the media legislation originated from the Sudan Consortium on Freedom of Expression and Development of Democratic Media Legislation. This consortium brings together local and international stakeholders of which AMDISS (Association for Media Development in South Sudan) is the key local partner in Southern Sudan. International partners include Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Article 19, International Media Support (IMS) and Olof Palme International Centre (OPIC). Article 19 which represents the Global Movement for freedom of experssion headquartered in London, provided the technical leadership on best practice in terms of assisting with drafting the current media legislation bills for Southern Sudan with the local partner (AMDISS) of which am the Executive Director. There are three key bills which we proposed as a blueprint for transforming the media landscape not just in Southern Sudan but also in the whole of Sudan, reforming existing pre-CPA and restrictive legislation to media freedoms in Sudan such the Press and Materials Publications Act 2009 and its antecident Press and Publications Act 2004. These laws are still to date the subject of contentious huggling between the SPLM and the ruling National Congress (NCP). We made several attempts to engage political and civil society leaders in both North and South to try reform or rescind the repressive pre-CPA laws without success in Khartoum but notable progress in the South of the Country. The three bills awaiting passage in the spirit of CPA implementation in Southern Sudan but also because of the need for media to play a key public service role in a free and fair elections to provide spirited coverage and debate on issues of public interest, and in the absence of any legislation or set of rules of the game for media development and democratic transformation, it is important that an attempt is made now to fill the vacuum to fulfill the peace agreement and not wait until after the elections. Otherwise why then bother all this time about changing the laws in Sudan to be compatible with the CPA? I guess then that the elections should have been stipulated to take place first back in 2005/6 without changing any laws and leaving it to the elected parliaments to do the work. Without dectracting further, the key bills are the RTI bill which regulated access to information held by both public and private bodies, and the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation Bill which establishes the public service broadcaster and transforms state controlled radio and tv into public service broadcasters, and finally the independent Media Authority draft legislation which establishes an autonomous media commission independent of government or party political control or interference, which would be the regulatory authority, with transparent mechanisms for press and broadcast compaints board, appeal processes, self regulatory system for print media and so forth. There is a handbook on "South Sudan: Media Legislation, Policy and Legal Framework" which is just going to the press on Monday 23, and it provides an authoritative reference on the current set of media legislation for Southern Sudan and the work done to date with the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on formulating media policy and legislation which we hope to extend to the rest of the country to adopt the blueprints of public service broadcasting, press freedoms etc compatible with the Bill fo Rights and interim constitutions mandated by the CPA. Kind regards Hakim D Moi, Ph.D. Executive Director, AMDISS Dear David,
The current pieces of media legislation draft bills before the parliament in Juba is an attempt to implement the very principles of the CPA and democratic transformation as stipulated in the National Interim Constitution and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS), the Bill of Rights which provides for freedom of expression, etc.

So it’s not like attempting to jump the gun, and the work leading up to the media legislation originated from the Sudan Consortium on Freedom of Expression and Development of Democratic Media Legislation. This consortium brings together local and international stakeholders of which AMDISS (Association for Media Development in South Sudan) is the key local partner in Southern Sudan. International partners include Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Article 19, International Media Support (IMS) and Olof Palme International Centre (OPIC). Article 19 which represents the Global Movement for freedom of experssion headquartered in London, provided the technical leadership on best practice in terms of assisting with drafting the current media legislation bills for Southern Sudan with the local partner (AMDISS) of which am the Executive Director.

There are three key bills which we proposed as a blueprint for transforming the media landscape not just in Southern Sudan but also in the whole of Sudan, reforming existing pre-CPA and restrictive legislation to media freedoms in Sudan such the Press and Materials Publications Act 2009 and its antecident Press and Publications Act 2004. These laws are still to date the subject of contentious huggling between the SPLM and the ruling National Congress (NCP). We made several attempts to engage political and civil society leaders in both North and South to try reform or rescind the repressive pre-CPA laws without success in Khartoum but notable progress in the South of the Country.

The three bills awaiting passage in the spirit of CPA implementation in Southern Sudan but also because of the need for media to play a key public service role in a free and fair elections to provide spirited coverage and debate on issues of public interest, and in the absence of any legislation or set of rules of the game for media development and democratic transformation, it is important that an attempt is made now to fill the vacuum to fulfill the peace agreement and not wait until after the elections. Otherwise why then bother all this time about changing the laws in Sudan to be compatible with the CPA? I guess then that the elections should have been stipulated to take place first back in 2005/6 without changing any laws and leaving it to the elected parliaments to do the work.

Without dectracting further, the key bills are the RTI bill which regulated access to information held by both public and private bodies, and the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation Bill which establishes the public service broadcaster and transforms state controlled radio and tv into public service broadcasters, and finally the independent Media Authority draft legislation which establishes an autonomous media commission independent of government or party political control or interference, which would be the regulatory authority, with transparent mechanisms for press and broadcast compaints board, appeal processes, self regulatory system for print media and so forth.

There is a handbook on “South Sudan: Media Legislation, Policy and Legal Framework” which is just going to the press on Monday 23, and it provides an authoritative reference on the current set of media legislation for Southern Sudan and the work done to date with the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on formulating media policy and legislation which we hope to extend to the rest of the country to adopt the blueprints of public service broadcasting, press freedoms etc compatible with the Bill fo Rights and interim constitutions mandated by the CPA.

Kind regards
Hakim D Moi, Ph.D.
Executive Director,
AMDISS

]]> Comment on South Sudan Should Make Freedom of Expression a Priority by David Barsoum http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/17/south-sudan-should-make-freedom-of-expression-a-priority/comment-page-1/#comment-5102 David Barsoum Wed, 18 Nov 2009 16:33:13 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1434#comment-5102 Dear Brian, Currently the SPLM/A rules absolute in South Sudan, as such, and while no one questions their intentions behind establishing institutions, one just wonders whether it would not be better to wait for the elections and the establishment of an elected Government and Parliament? Dear Brian,
Currently the SPLM/A rules absolute in South Sudan, as such, and while no one questions their intentions behind establishing institutions, one just wonders whether it would not be better to wait for the elections and the establishment of an elected Government and Parliament?

]]> Comment on The Arab and Western Media Responses to Darfur by Ben Parker http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/16/the-arab-and-western-media-responses-to-darfur/comment-page-1/#comment-5092 Ben Parker Tue, 17 Nov 2009 12:39:32 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1425#comment-5092 Why would anyone expect British or American newspapers to be early or super-accurate on an African conflict story anyway? Anyway, to add a few details: In late 2003, some foreign Arab media (Egyptian TV for example) were getting travel permits for Darfur while there were quite a number of non-Arabic foreign correspondents based in Nairobi who would have gone but could not get in. Sudanese journalists did not need permits, and the Economist was lucky to have a gutsy and resourceful stringer and so was one of the earliest "mainstream" British publications to get a dateline and real coverage from inside Darfur. The UN consciously started to be a little more forthright in its public statements from December 2003 which generated more media appetite. The "story" took off when Kapila mentioned Rwanda in March 2004 (just as hacks were preparing their Rwanda 10-year commemorative pieces) and when TV footage was available for English-language channels that April. By the way, the current levels of media coverage on Darfur (late 2009) are at their lowest for some time: see the graph here: http://www.google.com/trends?q=darfur The level of public interest (as measured by Google searches - the upper graph) however is now proportionally high, compared to the volume of media coverage. Maybe that means there's unmet demand for media coverage of Darfur now? What would readers of SSRC like to read about? Why would anyone expect British or American newspapers to be early or super-accurate on an African conflict story anyway?

Anyway, to add a few details:

In late 2003, some foreign Arab media (Egyptian TV for example) were getting travel permits for Darfur while there were quite a number of non-Arabic foreign correspondents based in Nairobi who would have gone but could not get in.

Sudanese journalists did not need permits, and the Economist was lucky to have a gutsy and resourceful stringer and so was one of the earliest “mainstream” British publications to get a dateline and real coverage from inside Darfur.

The UN consciously started to be a little more forthright in its public statements from December 2003 which generated more media appetite.

The “story” took off when Kapila mentioned Rwanda in March 2004 (just as hacks were preparing their Rwanda 10-year commemorative pieces) and when TV footage was available for English-language channels that April.

By the way, the current levels of media coverage on Darfur (late 2009) are at their lowest for some time: see the graph here: http://www.google.com/trends?q=darfur

The level of public interest (as measured by Google searches – the upper graph) however is now proportionally high, compared to the volume of media coverage.

Maybe that means there’s unmet demand for media coverage of Darfur now?

What would readers of SSRC like to read about?

]]> Comment on The Arab and Western Media Responses to Darfur by Alex de Waal http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/16/the-arab-and-western-media-responses-to-darfur/comment-page-1/#comment-5088 Alex de Waal Mon, 16 Nov 2009 14:30:28 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1425#comment-5088 Dear Guy, this is an extremely important posting. The facts you present speak for themselves. Underpinning this is something equally, or more important about the way in which different political cultures use the media. The Arab and African media tend to speak to their own domestic audiences and not to western ones. In most African countries, the print media has a tendency to cover stories in other countries using wire services which have a generally European or American outlook, but this is less so in the Arab world. Interpreting this as silence or not caring betrays the worldview of those who make this allegation. A vast amount of the western media coverage of Darfur has had a campaigning agenda: demanding international troops or similar, or raising funds for humanitarian operations. Criticism of other media for 'silence' is often not because of silence about the facts, but failure to endorse such an agenda. I am grateful to you for helping put the record straight on this. Alex Dear Guy,

this is an extremely important posting. The facts you present speak for themselves. Underpinning this is something equally, or more important about the way in which different political cultures use the media.

The Arab and African media tend to speak to their own domestic audiences and not to western ones. In most African countries, the print media has a tendency to cover stories in other countries using wire services which have a generally European or American outlook, but this is less so in the Arab world. Interpreting this as silence or not caring betrays the worldview of those who make this allegation.

A vast amount of the western media coverage of Darfur has had a campaigning agenda: demanding international troops or similar, or raising funds for humanitarian operations. Criticism of other media for ’silence’ is often not because of silence about the facts, but failure to endorse such an agenda.

I am grateful to you for helping put the record straight on this.

Alex

]]> Comment on Thoughts on the Future of Sudan, From the Past by Vagn Sparre-Ulrich http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/13/thoughts-on-the-future-of-sudan-from-the-past/comment-page-1/#comment-5087 Vagn Sparre-Ulrich Mon, 16 Nov 2009 14:23:35 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1420#comment-5087 Thank you, good old chap.... Thank you, good old chap….

]]> Comment on Reading the Responses to the AUPD Report by Khalid Al Nur http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/12/reading-the-responses-to-the-aupd-report/comment-page-1/#comment-5077 Khalid Al Nur Fri, 13 Nov 2009 19:10:42 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1414#comment-5077 Let me add to my comment to point out that the AU itself is completely invisible in setting out its agenda and point of view in the Sudanese media. Apart from one press conference in September, no member of the AU Panel has been quoted except for Ahmad Mahir who notoriously said that the purpose of the panel was to get President Al-Bashir off the ICC hook. There is one reference to an AU spokesman Mr. Barny Afaku but that is all. Most of the information on the AU panel available to the Sudanese media has come from this website. Let me add to my comment to point out that the AU itself is completely invisible in setting out its agenda and point of view in the Sudanese media. Apart from one press conference in September, no member of the AU Panel has been quoted except for Ahmad Mahir who notoriously said that the purpose of the panel was to get President Al-Bashir off the ICC hook. There is one reference to an AU spokesman Mr. Barny Afaku but that is all. Most of the information on the AU panel available to the Sudanese media has come from this website.

]]> Comment on Reading the Responses to the AUPD Report by Alex de Waal http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/12/reading-the-responses-to-the-aupd-report/comment-page-1/#comment-5074 Alex de Waal Fri, 13 Nov 2009 13:05:04 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1414#comment-5074 Dear Khalid why do I remain optimistic about the AU Panel? Partly it's optimism of the will--something has to come, and come soon, or Sudan as a whole is heading for a crisis of bigger proportions than anything seen recently. Time is very short and we need to make do with what is available now. There's no time for another inquiry or commission or panel--by the time it reports the events it is concerned with will have happened. At the moment UNAMID is without a head, and the head of UNMIS is leaving in a couple of months, without even a deputy in post. At least something is happening in Doha and there is a chief mediator in place. In the international system it can take months to make a senior appointment (remember the 10-month hiatus after Jan Pronk was expelled? The 8 month gap between the Sirte talks failure and Bassole's appointment?) So we have to make do with what we have--and three former heads of state with a pretty good grasp of the situation and a formidable convening power at an international level is a good place to start. Which brings me to the second point. Most reports of this kind are just that--reports. The focus of the commissioners or panellists is on getting a text and getting a formal adoption. From the beginning, Thabo Mbeki has insisted that a report is valueless unless it is implemented. He is a political operator and a man who has headed party and state institutions and is used to getting things done. The report is an instrument, not an objective--like an iceberg, most of it is beneath the surface. And what I know about what’s beneath the surface is reason for (rather modest) optimism. I share your (and everyone's) concerns about the AU and its follow-up or implementation capacity. I was part of the Abuja mediation team and I well recall the discussions in the final days of the talks about the need to keep up the momentum, not let anything drop. I then found myself literally alone among the team in continuing to talk with Abdel Wahid, and also all-but-alone in trying to convene the institutions that were supposed to make the security arrangements function (for the last 3 months of the talks I had worked exclusively on that). And I was just about the only one who advocated publicly for the DPA. I advocated for it not because I was convinced about every part of it (I knew better than many its shortcomings and was probably the member of the mediation team least happy with the document) but because I was convinced that if it failed, there wouldn't be another chance for Darfur for five years (I am waiting to see if that was accurate) and that the CPA would be endangered too. There wasn't a better deal on the shelf just waiting for someone to wave a magic wand, so better to try with what we had. Optimism of the will--and I don't regret it, although I paid a high price in being so publicly identified with a failed effort. And I can assure you that I found the AU's capacity in rising to this challenge to be less than satisfying. Ditto, I should add, the other 'guarantors' including the U.S. Do I expect the recommendations to be implemented as spelled out? Not at all. Is it a chance to make something happen that has not been happening to date? Yes. As I have written before, the odds are against. That’s not a reason to stop trying. Dear Khalid

why do I remain optimistic about the AU Panel? Partly it’s optimism of the will–something has to come, and come soon, or Sudan as a whole is heading for a crisis of bigger proportions than anything seen recently. Time is very short and we need to make do with what is available now. There’s no time for another inquiry or commission or panel–by the time it reports the events it is concerned with will have happened. At the moment UNAMID is without a head, and the head of UNMIS is leaving in a couple of months, without even a deputy in post. At least something is happening in Doha and there is a chief mediator in place. In the international system it can take months to make a senior appointment (remember the 10-month hiatus after Jan Pronk was expelled? The 8 month gap between the Sirte talks failure and Bassole’s appointment?) So we have to make do with what we have–and three former heads of state with a pretty good grasp of the situation and a formidable convening power at an international level is a good place to start.

Which brings me to the second point. Most reports of this kind are just that–reports. The focus of the commissioners or panellists is on getting a text and getting a formal adoption. From the beginning, Thabo Mbeki has insisted that a report is valueless unless it is implemented. He is a political operator and a man who has headed party and state institutions and is used to getting things done. The report is an instrument, not an objective–like an iceberg, most of it is beneath the surface. And what I know about what’s beneath the surface is reason for (rather modest) optimism.

I share your (and everyone’s) concerns about the AU and its follow-up or implementation capacity. I was part of the Abuja mediation team and I well recall the discussions in the final days of the talks about the need to keep up the momentum, not let anything drop. I then found myself literally alone among the team in continuing to talk with Abdel Wahid, and also all-but-alone in trying to convene the institutions that were supposed to make the security arrangements function (for the last 3 months of the talks I had worked exclusively on that). And I was just about the only one who advocated publicly for the DPA. I advocated for it not because I was convinced about every part of it (I knew better than many its shortcomings and was probably the member of the mediation team least happy with the document) but because I was convinced that if it failed, there wouldn’t be another chance for Darfur for five years (I am waiting to see if that was accurate) and that the CPA would be endangered too. There wasn’t a better deal on the shelf just waiting for someone to wave a magic wand, so better to try with what we had. Optimism of the will–and I don’t regret it, although I paid a high price in being so publicly identified with a failed effort. And I can assure you that I found the AU’s capacity in rising to this challenge to be less than satisfying. Ditto, I should add, the other ‘guarantors’ including the U.S.

Do I expect the recommendations to be implemented as spelled out? Not at all. Is it a chance to make something happen that has not been happening to date? Yes. As I have written before, the odds are against. That’s not a reason to stop trying.

]]> Comment on Reading the Responses to the AUPD Report by Khalid Omer http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/11/12/reading-the-responses-to-the-aupd-report/comment-page-1/#comment-5072 Khalid Omer Fri, 13 Nov 2009 02:38:53 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=1414#comment-5072 Let us assume Khartoum does not implement what Mbeki asked or in his report, what will the AU do? I am trying to do a reality check here. We must remember that the AU you have so much faith in was the guarantor of the ailing Darfur Peace Agreement. Minnawi who is the DPA's major signatory blamed the AU saying it is the one who failed to make sure that Khartoum live up to what it signed particularly in terms of remitting money to the Darfur fund. The reason Sudan is so comfortable with the AU is that they believe they are easily manipulated and they never made that a secret. To be extremely frank you are the only one I came across with so much enthusiasm about the AUPD report. I have seen statements by the SPLM and AbdelWahab Al-Afandi and others saying the proposals made on the hybrid courts are unrealistic and are only good on paper. For a starter, it takes a political will on the part of Khartoum and this is non-existent. Moreover it also requires an admittance of atrocities committed in Darfur by the government and that will never happen. I sincerely wished I could share your optimism Alex but so far I see no reasons to. I will restate my position. The report has reached a dead end. Let us assume Khartoum does not implement what Mbeki asked or in his report, what will the AU do? I am trying to do a reality check here. We must remember that the AU you have so much faith in was the guarantor of the ailing Darfur Peace Agreement. Minnawi who is the DPA’s major signatory blamed the AU saying it is the one who failed to make sure that Khartoum live up to what it signed particularly in terms of remitting money to the Darfur fund.

The reason Sudan is so comfortable with the AU is that they believe they are easily manipulated and they never made that a secret.

To be extremely frank you are the only one I came across with so much enthusiasm about the AUPD report. I have seen statements by the SPLM and AbdelWahab Al-Afandi and others saying the proposals made on the hybrid courts are unrealistic and are only good on paper. For a starter, it takes a political will on the part of Khartoum and this is non-existent. Moreover it also requires an admittance of atrocities committed in Darfur by the government and that will never happen.

I sincerely wished I could share your optimism Alex but so far I see no reasons to. I will restate my position. The report has reached a dead end.

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