The indictment of President Bashir is a breach of international law. The ICC does not have any jurisdiction to indict Heads of State and Governments. The ICC has already damaged its international credibility and image. The function of the ICC is not to go around indicting Heads of state and Goverments worldwide. Diplomacy should have been given a chance in the case of Sudan.

Surely, the sudanese will not allow their leaders to be extradited to be tried by non-Sudanese court system.

Who will indict former European powers for colonial crimes committed in Africa? They should be charged for war crimes and crimes against humanity they committed in Africa. Europe could not get away with such crimes. The UK should be a prime suspect in such crimes against humanity in Africa retrospect to the Anglo-Boer-Zulu War (1899-1901), the Mahiddiyya in sudan and the Anglo-Nuer 30 year war in which the UK deployed the Royal Air against the Nuer of South Sudan. The Nuer would be the first to sue the UK on war crimes and crimes against humanity. Why the ICC does not indict the SPLM/A leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity in South Sudan?

ICC would not be a legit body without pursuing such criminals. Most importantly, the USA should join the ICC for it become a respected legal institution. All 5 Permanent member states of the UN Scurity Council should have full membership in the court. It looks likw the ICC is doing a witch hunt against non-European leaders. This is neocolonialism of third kind.

First, it does indeed seem possible that there will be no impact, or limited impact. In the last week, the political debates in Sudan have strengthened Bashir’s position. He now has most of the mainstream political forces, including most importantly the SPLM, behind him. He also has a lot of support among African states. From this position of relative strength, he is less likely to respond by lashing out. Indeed, if Bashir remains calm, and keeps the CPA on track, he will be posing a greater challenge to the ICC.

Second, the prosecutorial strategy during the first two years after the UN Security Council referred the Darfur case was not without controversy. One debate in particular was whether the arrest warrants against the first two men, Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb, should be public or sealed. I supported an initial approach that gave the Sudan Government the opportunity to cooperate. Others argued in favour of sealed arrest warrants, which would have provided the Court with an opportunity to arrest Ahmed Haroun if he travelled abroad–which in his ministerial capacity, he was likely to do.

The Prosecutor’s approach of focusing on two individuals, one a middle-ranking operative and the other a local militia leader, and not seeking a sealed warrant, appeared to be an effort to make the prosecutions compatible with the wider international approach which is a negotiated transition in Sudan. About a year ago, this prosecutorial strategy changed. But it was only a few weeks ago that the UN and the key member states woke up to this, despite the clear signals that the Prosecutor was sending from December last year.