Comments on: The Hour of the Hardliners http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2008/05/11/the-hour-of-the-hardliners/ Fri, 20 Nov 2009 10:36:10 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Hamid E Ali http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2008/05/11/the-hour-of-the-hardliners/comment-page-1/#comment-1681 Hamid E Ali Wed, 14 May 2008 17:39:26 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=482#comment-1681 Isaac Newton said when a force is applied to an object, it accelerates. That force is May 10 events. As result of this force, Sudan will acceleration in the direction of peace and democratic transformation. Let us allow the political process, sense and reasons prevail over demagoguery and false patriotism. Any Sudanese blood is valuable whether in Khartoum or Elfasher. Now the elites in Khartoum taste the bitterness of war that might accelerates the process of peace and reconciliations in Sudan and Darfur in particular. Previously, people heard about Darfur as if it is another planet. Now all, conclude that violence always will produce counter-violence that could proportionate more destructive. The government should realize that their policies reached the dead-end. There must be a U-turn; the government is in real need for a new blood and team instead of the old clique to carry out the transformation. Isaac Newton said when a force is applied to an object, it accelerates. That force is May 10 events. As result of this force, Sudan will acceleration in the direction of peace and democratic transformation. Let us allow the political process, sense and reasons prevail over demagoguery and false patriotism. Any Sudanese blood is valuable whether in Khartoum or Elfasher. Now the elites in Khartoum taste the bitterness of war that might accelerates the process of peace and reconciliations in Sudan and Darfur in particular. Previously, people heard about Darfur as if it is another planet. Now all, conclude that violence always will produce counter-violence that could proportionate more destructive. The government should realize that their policies reached the dead-end. There must be a U-turn; the government is in real need for a new blood and team instead of the old clique to carry out the transformation.

]]> By: Alex de Waal http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2008/05/11/the-hour-of-the-hardliners/comment-page-1/#comment-1674 Alex de Waal Tue, 13 May 2008 20:28:41 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=482#comment-1674 There are many unanswered questions in the fallout from the battle of Omdurman. But the position of the Southern leadership is not in doubt. The NCP has signed the CPA and is therefore committed to elections and the referendum on self-determination. JEM has not signed and has no such formal commitments. The SPLM will stick with what it knows. And First Vice President Salva Kiir knows that when the NCP-security leadership is under threat and goes into security lockdown mode, his best strategy for influencing the course of events is to stand beside them and sway their internal debates. The division between the Sudan Armed Forces and the specialist security forces loyal to senior members of the government is a real cause for concern. There are many unanswered questions in the fallout from the battle of Omdurman. But the position of the Southern leadership is not in doubt. The NCP has signed the CPA and is therefore committed to elections and the referendum on self-determination. JEM has not signed and has no such formal commitments. The SPLM will stick with what it knows. And First Vice President Salva Kiir knows that when the NCP-security leadership is under threat and goes into security lockdown mode, his best strategy for influencing the course of events is to stand beside them and sway their internal debates.

The division between the Sudan Armed Forces and the specialist security forces loyal to senior members of the government is a real cause for concern.

]]> By: Vagn Sparre-Ulrich http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2008/05/11/the-hour-of-the-hardliners/comment-page-1/#comment-1670 Vagn Sparre-Ulrich Mon, 12 May 2008 22:57:17 +0000 http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/?p=482#comment-1670 Dear Alex, I highly appreciate your analysis of the situation in Sudan after the JEM-attack. Your gloomy conclusion that we will see a hardening of the government’s stance on Darfur is evident. But I have a question which is based on my attempts to see Sudan as a whole: Where does South Sudan fit into this? 1. I know that Salva Kiir condemned the JEM attack. But doesn’t the SPLM in this situation play it by a “wait and see position” in order to see what SPLM can gain from this situation. As I see it, the government of Omar Al-Bashir is weakened by this attack although it repulsed it militarily. For the first time in history the periphery in Sudan showed some power. And one of the main reasons for this weakening of the GOS is the strengthening of the SPLM political position – a part of the periphery. Suddenly, the SPLM is a key player in Sudanese politics. SPLM can really make demands to Omar Al-Bashir, or else? What about the Abyei enclave for example? Or the other non-fulfilled items on the CPA? I see a politically weakened Omar Al-Beshir government today as compared to before the JEM-attack. 2. It seems as if the GOS army were more or less kept out of the main fighting. The bulk of the fighting was done by the different security organizations on the GOS side! And they lost a lot of lives according to some reports. To me it points to the fact that a great part of the GOS army has ties to Darfur. The periphery is being a part of the power system now, but not necessarily a loyal one. I just thought that maybe the South Sudan factor should be emphasized at this point in order to get the most precise picture. And maybe some officers would like a regime change in order to balance the power between the Center and the Periphery somewhat more? As another option. A politically weakened center or government can lead to many different scenarios. Dear Alex,

I highly appreciate your analysis of the situation in Sudan after the JEM-attack. Your gloomy conclusion that we will see a hardening of the government’s stance on Darfur is evident.

But I have a question which is based on my attempts to see Sudan as a whole: Where does South Sudan fit into this?

1. I know that Salva Kiir condemned the JEM attack. But doesn’t the SPLM in this situation play it by a “wait and see position” in order to see what SPLM can gain from this situation. As I see it, the government of Omar Al-Bashir is weakened by this attack although it repulsed it militarily. For the first time in history the periphery in Sudan showed some power. And one of the main reasons for this weakening of the GOS is the strengthening of the SPLM political position – a part of the periphery. Suddenly, the SPLM is a key player in Sudanese politics. SPLM can really make demands to Omar Al-Bashir, or else? What about the Abyei enclave for example? Or the other non-fulfilled items on the CPA? I see a politically weakened Omar Al-Beshir government today as compared to before the JEM-attack.

2. It seems as if the GOS army were more or less kept out of the main fighting. The bulk of the fighting was done by the different security organizations on the GOS side! And they lost a lot of lives according to some reports. To me it points to the fact that a great part of the GOS army has ties to Darfur. The periphery is being a part of the power system now, but not necessarily a loyal one.

I just thought that maybe the South Sudan factor should be emphasized at this point in order to get the most precise picture.

And maybe some officers would like a regime change in order to balance the power between the Center and the Periphery somewhat more? As another option.

A politically weakened center or government can lead to many different scenarios.

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