Comments on: Cause and Effect http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/ Fri, 20 Nov 2009 10:36:10 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Maggie Siegel http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-2530 Maggie Siegel Thu, 06 Nov 2008 02:19:31 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-2530 I agree with Homer-Dixon that there is no one factor that is more important or more responsible for the violence in Darfur. Climate change, the government, famine, and many other factors all were a necessary part of the escalation to violence. I agree that this complex of a system is best understood multiplicatively and thus requiring that each cause was of equal importance to the end result. It helped me to look at a mathematical example. Take 5 x 20 x 8 = 800, none of the multipliers (5,8,and 20) are more responsible for the end product (200) than any other one. To assume that 20 is more important because it is a larger number is absurd. Regardless of its size, it alone cannot account for the equation equaling 800. I think this analogy works as a parallel from complex issues arising from many causes. Although De Waal would like to charge Darfur’s government as the “main culprit” for its country’s violence, the idea that there is even a “main culprit” is flawed in such a system. I agree with Homer-Dixon that there is no one factor that is more important or more responsible for the violence in Darfur. Climate change, the government, famine, and many other factors all were a necessary part of the escalation to violence. I agree that this complex of a system is best understood multiplicatively and thus requiring that each cause was of equal importance to the end result. It helped me to look at a mathematical example. Take 5 x 20 x 8 = 800, none of the multipliers (5,8,and 20) are more responsible for the end product (200) than any other one. To assume that 20 is more important because it is a larger number is absurd. Regardless of its size, it alone cannot account for the equation equaling 800. I think this analogy works as a parallel from complex issues arising from many causes. Although De Waal would like to charge Darfur’s government as the “main culprit” for its country’s violence, the idea that there is even a “main culprit” is flawed in such a system.

]]> By: Elizabeth Lemons http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-2528 Elizabeth Lemons Wed, 05 Nov 2008 22:09:58 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-2528 I appreciated Alex da Waal's article, "Is Climate Change the Culprit for Darfur?" I felt that he adequately illustrated the complexity of the conflict in Darfur, and he was careful to emphasize the intricacy of the variables' relationships and interactions, despite Tad Homer-Dixon's criticism that he took some variables into account more than others. de Waal carefully reached back in time to pull information that may have an effect on the current conflict. He emphasizes population growth as a factor that magnifies the stress on limited resources, which are diminishing due to climate change. He also notes that the government lacked the capacity to respond to the famine of 1984-5, and as failed nomads developed violent livelihoods, raiding cattle in the Darfur region, the government still failed to intervene. de Waal identifies climate change as only one factor that is responsible for the conflict, and I feel that he is right in prioritizing weak government as a related variable. Though the government's failure to respond is not necessarily a cause of conflict, the general failure of the nation-state in the Sudan is certainly an integral factor related to the conflict. I appreciated Alex da Waal’s article, “Is Climate Change the Culprit for Darfur?” I felt that he adequately illustrated the complexity of the conflict in Darfur, and he was careful to emphasize the intricacy of the variables’ relationships and interactions, despite Tad Homer-Dixon’s criticism that he took some variables into account more than others. de Waal carefully reached back in time to pull information that may have an effect on the current conflict. He emphasizes population growth as a factor that magnifies the stress on limited resources, which are diminishing due to climate change. He also notes that the government lacked the capacity to respond to the famine of 1984-5, and as failed nomads developed violent livelihoods, raiding cattle in the Darfur region, the government still failed to intervene. de Waal identifies climate change as only one factor that is responsible for the conflict, and I feel that he is right in prioritizing weak government as a related variable. Though the government’s failure to respond is not necessarily a cause of conflict, the general failure of the nation-state in the Sudan is certainly an integral factor related to the conflict.

]]> By: Brittany Brandewie http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1625 Brittany Brandewie Thu, 24 Apr 2008 14:35:37 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-1625 I believe that Alex de Waal and Thomas Homer-Dixon both make excellent points in their articles. However, I tend to agree with more of Thomas’s arguments. I agree that we should not label the absence of something as the cause of the problems in places like Darfur. For example, arguing that the absence of governmental aid or economic and market security, should not be labeled as the cause for all the environmental conflicts which may then relate to the civil conflicts. The presence of situations is what causes the occurring events. A single event will cause a domino effect of events. For instance, the continual droughts put pressure on the land which will lessen crop cultivation. When crop production is low there is less cash crops being produced to supplement an income. With a lowering income the people widen the poverty gap line creating more impoverished communities, and high poverty increases stress which may cause civil conflicts between different social groups. Homer-Dixon makes a good point in addressing the issue that the true cause of violence cannot be explained by a single event. Changing climate, land mismanagement, and large increases in population are many of the causes that lead to the domino effect towards violence. These changes all require people to change the way that they live which adds a significant amount of stress to their lives, increasing the possibilities for violence. I believe that Alex de Waal and Thomas Homer-Dixon both make excellent points in their articles. However, I tend to agree with more of Thomas’s arguments. I agree that we should not label the absence of something as the cause of the problems in places like Darfur. For example, arguing that the absence of governmental aid or economic and market security, should not be labeled as the cause for all the environmental conflicts which may then relate to the civil conflicts. The presence of situations is what causes the occurring events. A single event will cause a domino effect of events. For instance, the continual droughts put pressure on the land which will lessen crop cultivation. When crop production is low there is less cash crops being produced to supplement an income. With a lowering income the people widen the poverty gap line creating more impoverished communities, and high poverty increases stress which may cause civil conflicts between different social groups.
Homer-Dixon makes a good point in addressing the issue that the true cause of violence cannot be explained by a single event. Changing climate, land mismanagement, and large increases in population are many of the causes that lead to the domino effect towards violence. These changes all require people to change the way that they live which adds a significant amount of stress to their lives, increasing the possibilities for violence.

]]> By: Laura Echler http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1619 Laura Echler Thu, 24 Apr 2008 03:22:28 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-1619 Thomas Homer-Dixon’s response to Alex de Waal’s post, Is Climate Change the Culprit for Darfur, identifies the invalidity of the tendencies of many researchers to claim causal links between social issues. As I agree with Homer-Dixon in the sense that these links are mostly riddled with inaccuracies and that no single factor is the “culprit,” it is important to note the intentions of these statements. It is an unfortunate effect that in many instances policy makers and those associated with the media favor overly simplistic deductions drawn from in-depth research on regions such as Darfur. These are then taken on as the mainstream view and consequently, other factors regarding regional struggles are ignored. Perhaps criticism should be placed on those who attempt to find a simple-solution to a very convoluted situation. The current state of Darfur is extremely complex and identifying causal links to violence is essential if positive change is to be made. I agree with Homer-Dixon that no one factor is more important than another or that it is possible to “know a priori the consequences of subtracting or altering only one factor.” But, it is vital to fully understand all the inter-workings of a social construct such as those within Darfur before appropriate steps should be made to counter violence. However, when dealing with a multifaceted complex, there must exist a starting ground from which to step. It is fundamental to identify these causal links first, if one wants to see the larger picture. Unfortunately, violence and resource depletion do not wait until accurate research has been conducted and appropriate policies have been drawn. Research is playing catch-up to the constant changes of societies and the seemingly never-ending additions of factors and consequently, inaccuracies run rampant. It is essential not only for research to break down such intricate situations but also for those interpreting them to understand that for a complex problem there must be a complex cause and solution. Thomas Homer-Dixon’s response to Alex de Waal’s post, Is Climate Change the Culprit for Darfur, identifies the invalidity of the tendencies of many researchers to claim causal links between social issues. As I agree with Homer-Dixon in the sense that these links are mostly riddled with inaccuracies and that no single factor is the “culprit,” it is important to note the intentions of these statements. It is an unfortunate effect that in many instances policy makers and those associated with the media favor overly simplistic deductions drawn from in-depth research on regions such as Darfur. These are then taken on as the mainstream view and consequently, other factors regarding regional struggles are ignored. Perhaps criticism should be placed on those who attempt to find a simple-solution to a very convoluted situation. The current state of Darfur is extremely complex and identifying causal links to violence is essential if positive change is to be made. I agree with Homer-Dixon that no one factor is more important than another or that it is possible to “know a priori the consequences of subtracting or altering only one factor.” But, it is vital to fully understand all the inter-workings of a social construct such as those within Darfur before appropriate steps should be made to counter violence. However, when dealing with a multifaceted complex, there must exist a starting ground from which to step. It is fundamental to identify these causal links first, if one wants to see the larger picture. Unfortunately, violence and resource depletion do not wait until accurate research has been conducted and appropriate policies have been drawn. Research is playing catch-up to the constant changes of societies and the seemingly never-ending additions of factors and consequently, inaccuracies run rampant. It is essential not only for research to break down such intricate situations but also for those interpreting them to understand that for a complex problem there must be a complex cause and solution.

]]> By: Alison Smock http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1616 Alison Smock Thu, 24 Apr 2008 00:58:37 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-1616 Alex de Waal’s recognition of government as a culprit for the armed violence in Darfur is not only completely accurate, but also refreshing. While the environmental conditions and depleted natural resources obviously present issues and challenges that require immediate attention and action, it is the government that provides the basis for such action and should be the focus of adaptation in itself. The situation in Darfur is so often oversimplified and analogous relationships between climate change, degradation, and conflict are much too quickly concluded. By constructing such quick conclusions and therefore narrowing strategies and recommendations, climate change is often cited as the sole reason for degradation and conflict and is therefore the only focus in assembling models for recovery. This, in turn, ignores the fact that other variables may be present in the equation, such as human interaction and its effect upon both degradation and violence. Although climate change may present an opponent that many find overwhelming, the issues within human interaction are those that can be addressed and improved by social institutions. While climate change is no doubt an intimidating adversary, social conflicts must be recognized as an additional variable and therefore present an opportunity for optimism. These disputes can be easily settled and solved non-violently, but it is the government that must undergo remodeling to do so. We must begin rebuilding from the inside of Darfur and its government and social infrastructure before we can successfully address the larger and more daunting challenges presented by climate change. Consequently, when possible solutions are suggested - such as the employment of the underground lake for water reserves - we can be confident that such recommendations create advances rather than catalysts for even more conflict and violence. Alex de Waal’s recognition of government as a culprit for the armed violence in Darfur is not only completely accurate, but also refreshing. While the environmental conditions and depleted natural resources obviously present issues and challenges that require immediate attention and action, it is the government that provides the basis for such action and should be the focus of adaptation in itself. The situation in Darfur is so often oversimplified and analogous relationships between climate change, degradation, and conflict are much too quickly concluded. By constructing such quick conclusions and therefore narrowing strategies and recommendations, climate change is often cited as the sole reason for degradation and conflict and is therefore the only focus in assembling models for recovery. This, in turn, ignores the fact that other variables may be present in the equation, such as human interaction and its effect upon both degradation and violence. Although climate change may present an opponent that many find overwhelming, the issues within human interaction are those that can be addressed and improved by social institutions. While climate change is no doubt an intimidating adversary, social conflicts must be recognized as an additional variable and therefore present an opportunity for optimism. These disputes can be easily settled and solved non-violently, but it is the government that must undergo remodeling to do so. We must begin rebuilding from the inside of Darfur and its government and social infrastructure before we can successfully address the larger and more daunting challenges presented by climate change. Consequently, when possible solutions are suggested – such as the employment of the underground lake for water reserves – we can be confident that such recommendations create advances rather than catalysts for even more conflict and violence.

]]> By: Morgan McFadyen http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1615 Morgan McFadyen Thu, 24 Apr 2008 00:31:13 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-1615 The crisis and situation in Darfur is undoubtedly a complex puzzle to piece together. Homer-Dixon and De Waal perform excellent examinations into the causal effects of the tragedies that are unfolding. I would like to specifically address the post by Homer-Dixon. I must firmly disagree with the following statement: “Here, again, Alex argues that the absence of something (in this case, economic incentives arising from public sector investment and good markets) caused an event. But something that doesn’t exist — or never happened — can’t be a cause.” I understand that, technically, “nothing” happened and that therefore since “nothing” occurred it can not produce a viable effect. However, not doing anything positive is equally as harmful as doing something negative in an already depleted situation. Since the government chose NOT to act on behalf of its countrymen, I feel they are a feasible factor in the continuation of the downfall in the Darfur region. Returning focus to De Waal, I concur with the following conclusion: “Climate change causes livelihood change, which in turn causes disputes. Social institutions can handle these conflicts and settle them in a non-violent manner — it is mismanagement and militarization that cause war and massacre.” Climate is a key factor in the survival of man. When a man’s climate turns on him, his entire existence is spun upside down. Nonetheless, government and other such institutions have been established to cope with such circumstances. When these establishments are mismanaged and regrettably militarized, chaos will shortly follow. Such is what happened and is ongoing in Darfur. Conclusively, now that the causes and effects have been researched, analyzed and hypothesized, the next logical step is to act. One can only write so many papers, at a certain point, one must leave the crowd and start playing in the “game.” The crisis and situation in Darfur is undoubtedly a complex puzzle to piece together. Homer-Dixon and De Waal perform excellent examinations into the causal effects of the tragedies that are unfolding. I would like to specifically address the post by Homer-Dixon.
I must firmly disagree with the following statement:
“Here, again, Alex argues that the absence of something (in this case, economic incentives arising from public sector investment and good markets) caused an event. But something that doesn’t exist — or never happened — can’t be a cause.”
I understand that, technically, “nothing” happened and that therefore since “nothing” occurred it can not produce a viable effect. However, not doing anything positive is equally as harmful as doing something negative in an already depleted situation. Since the government chose NOT to act on behalf of its countrymen, I feel they are a feasible factor in the continuation of the downfall in the Darfur region.
Returning focus to De Waal, I concur with the following conclusion:
“Climate change causes livelihood change, which in turn causes disputes. Social institutions can handle these conflicts and settle them in a non-violent manner — it is mismanagement and militarization that cause war and massacre.”
Climate is a key factor in the survival of man. When a man’s climate turns on him, his entire existence is spun upside down. Nonetheless, government and other such institutions have been established to cope with such circumstances. When these establishments are mismanaged and regrettably militarized, chaos will shortly follow. Such is what happened and is ongoing in Darfur.
Conclusively, now that the causes and effects have been researched, analyzed and hypothesized, the next logical step is to act. One can only write so many papers, at a certain point, one must leave the crowd and start playing in the “game.”

]]> By: Shawnda Wedge http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1614 Shawnda Wedge Thu, 24 Apr 2008 00:14:32 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-1614 I think that both Alex de Waal and Thomas Homer-Dixon make some crucial points on the subject of violence in Darfur, which is indicated by their agreement on certain points. I do, however, agree with Homer-Dixon’s point that it is improbable to attempt to point out a most important cause when concerned with the violence and social unrest of Darfur, or of any other societies for that matter. Regarding Alex de Waal’s response to Homer-Dixon, I do not think that Homer-Dixon is implying that in any particular area one cause may not have more of an impact than another, but is stating that it is improbable to attempt to identify one most important cause in such a dynamic and complex society. As he stated in his response, “Cause and Effect”, the idea of non-linear behavior and disproportionality between cause and effect in such societies implies that it is completely possible for one cause to have a greater effect than another. I believe this is central to Homer-Dixon’s argument that one cause cannot be deemed most important in complex societies when other causes of much significance can be observed, but that different causes can have different degrees of effects. I think that both Alex de Waal and Thomas Homer-Dixon make some crucial points on the subject of violence in Darfur, which is indicated by their agreement on certain points. I do, however, agree with Homer-Dixon’s point that it is improbable to attempt to point out a most important cause when concerned with the violence and social unrest of Darfur, or of any other societies for that matter. Regarding Alex de Waal’s response to Homer-Dixon, I do not think that Homer-Dixon is implying that in any particular area one cause may not have more of an impact than another, but is stating that it is improbable to attempt to identify one most important cause in such a dynamic and complex society. As he stated in his response, “Cause and Effect”, the idea of non-linear behavior and disproportionality between cause and effect in such societies implies that it is completely possible for one cause to have a greater effect than another. I believe this is central to Homer-Dixon’s argument that one cause cannot be deemed most important in complex societies when other causes of much significance can be observed, but that different causes can have different degrees of effects.

]]> By: Cassandra http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1612 Cassandra Thu, 24 Apr 2008 00:08:06 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-1612 When contemplating the probable causes for the extensive disputes in Darfur, just as Homer-Dixon believes, pinpointing a particular additive cause is simply unrealistic and illogical. The disputes in Darfur are the result of so many factors, those of which the effects multiply because of the harshness of the conditions. Homer-Dixon makes a great statement regarding the issue at hand, by saying that “in the case of Darfur, it’s pointless to ask about, or to argue over, the relative importance of climate change as a cause of violence.” After making this statement, he voices that climate change is definite, valid example of the crisis in Darfur. Hearing someone say that it is pointless to ask or argue over this subject is so relieving – professors, students, politicians, environmentalists, anyone – strictly want to discuss the importance of climate change to violence, or whatever the issue. All global issues - global warming, inequalities, famine, civil war, poverty – need to be discussed for a solution, not to find the possible cause, or the implications for future generations. Intelligent people, who could potentially help the problems, are spending hours simply discussing the issue, or arguing over the causes, instead of finding a solution to the specific problem. The crises in Darfur could very well be caused by climatic changes – however, in this case, who cares? Darfur needs aid instead of scholarly individuals contemplating the topic. When contemplating the probable causes for the extensive disputes in Darfur, just as Homer-Dixon believes, pinpointing a particular additive cause is simply unrealistic and illogical. The disputes in Darfur are the result of so many factors, those of which the effects multiply because of the harshness of the conditions. Homer-Dixon makes a great statement regarding the issue at hand, by saying that “in the case of Darfur, it’s pointless to ask about, or to argue over, the relative importance of climate change as a cause of violence.” After making this statement, he voices that climate change is definite, valid example of the crisis in Darfur. Hearing someone say that it is pointless to ask or argue over this subject is so relieving – professors, students, politicians, environmentalists, anyone – strictly want to discuss the importance of climate change to violence, or whatever the issue. All global issues – global warming, inequalities, famine, civil war, poverty – need to be discussed for a solution, not to find the possible cause, or the implications for future generations. Intelligent people, who could potentially help the problems, are spending hours simply discussing the issue, or arguing over the causes, instead of finding a solution to the specific problem. The crises in Darfur could very well be caused by climatic changes – however, in this case, who cares? Darfur needs aid instead of scholarly individuals contemplating the topic.

]]> By: Ashley McCall http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1611 Ashley McCall Wed, 23 Apr 2008 23:55:54 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-1611 There are a few comments I would like to make, mostly in regards to the argument of the use of "cause", however, I will start by discussing the first section. This part I see as the butterfly effect. Firstly, I agree that simply using an additive perspective on such a complex system or situation like Darfur is absurd. In fact, no additive view on any country could provide results because everything is so intertwined that removing any type of variable like poor climate (i.e. a worsening climate that is not conducive to high yield or even sustainable agriculture) is impossible. Although, I'm in opposition to the statement "we can say with considerable confidence that any adequate description or explanation of the crisis must include climate change as a causal factor". I'm assuming that climate change is a causal factor of violence, which I disagree with, at least not directly. I think that climate contributes more to the lack of resources needed to sustain such a large population and when competition for resources occurs in such a highly populated area, violence can erupt, making climate an indirect factor. Once again, there are many different complicated factors within climate and the production or availability of resources that have an affect on violence. My other comment, or perhaps even question, is about the use of "cause". Although cause might be the wrong word semantically, but for the general public who are trying to learn and expand their horizons by researching Darfur and many other places, the word "cause" is perfect. If anthropologists are to appeal to the understanding of those who are interested but may not be familiar with the terminology, then by all means, use the terms necessary for their understanding. Literally, yes, I agree that "cause" cannot really apply to the government's lack of involvement when it comes to aiding Darfur or it's relief. However, perhaps to some, the cause could lie more within the government's intentions, they know that there is a serious problem at hand, yet they don't do anything to address that problem, which can CAUSE some tension with the people that could later result in violence. This also applies to the comment of the lack of public sector investment and a good market being a cause. Being put under such pressure to survive, perhaps depending on those investors and a good market, could cause some problems with making profits or even just enough to survive. This would therefore put more stress on the people and their economy, which could then result into violence. There are a few comments I would like to make, mostly in regards to the argument of the use of “cause”, however, I will start by discussing the first section. This part I see as the butterfly effect. Firstly, I agree that simply using an additive perspective on such a complex system or situation like Darfur is absurd. In fact, no additive view on any country could provide results because everything is so intertwined that removing any type of variable like poor climate (i.e. a worsening climate that is not conducive to high yield or even sustainable agriculture) is impossible. Although, I’m in opposition to the statement “we can say with considerable confidence that any adequate description or explanation of the crisis must include climate change as a causal factor”. I’m assuming that climate change is a causal factor of violence, which I disagree with, at least not directly. I think that climate contributes more to the lack of resources needed to sustain such a large population and when competition for resources occurs in such a highly populated area, violence can erupt, making climate an indirect factor. Once again, there are many different complicated factors within climate and the production or availability of resources that have an affect on violence.
My other comment, or perhaps even question, is about the use of “cause”. Although cause might be the wrong word semantically, but for the general public who are trying to learn and expand their horizons by researching Darfur and many other places, the word “cause” is perfect. If anthropologists are to appeal to the understanding of those who are interested but may not be familiar with the terminology, then by all means, use the terms necessary for their understanding. Literally, yes, I agree that “cause” cannot really apply to the government’s lack of involvement when it comes to aiding Darfur or it’s relief. However, perhaps to some, the cause could lie more within the government’s intentions, they know that there is a serious problem at hand, yet they don’t do anything to address that problem, which can CAUSE some tension with the people that could later result in violence. This also applies to the comment of the lack of public sector investment and a good market being a cause. Being put under such pressure to survive, perhaps depending on those investors and a good market, could cause some problems with making profits or even just enough to survive. This would therefore put more stress on the people and their economy, which could then result into violence.

]]> By: Dirk Druet http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-426 Dirk Druet Wed, 15 Aug 2007 14:12:27 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/08/02/cause-and-effect/#comment-426 In general I agree with Tad's comments on Professor DeWaal's excellent article. However, with respect to the second section of Tad's first point, it seems that the absolute exclusion of government inaction from consideration as a potential cause of conflict is not as black and white as it appears. In DeWaal's interesting historical overview, two key instances of inaction are mentioned. The first was an unfulfilled government promise to improve access to water resources for herders in the late 1960s. The failure to implement its promise, DeWaal argues, was partly due to dramatic changes in policy direction by successive governments. Here, the exclusion of this "non-event" as a potential cause holds: to consider the government's failure to properly manage resources as a necessary cause of the future conflict would be to present a counterfactual argument. We accept that given the complexity of the human-ecological context in which we are conducting analysis, we can not say with any degree of certainty that better government management of water resources would have prevented conflict. Further, as Tad notes, it is also incorrect to consider the instance of inaction as part of the cause of the conflict (or in the terms we have begun to adopt, as an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition) because there is no stimulus to identify as a cause, just a perceived void. When we look at DeWaal's next instance of government inaction, however, things seem to become more complicated. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement commits the government to a development policy that would see, among other things, better management of water resources for Arab herders that are currently forced into competition with black farmers. However, the Sudanese government has thus far failed to implement the policy. At first glance it would seem that again it would be incorrect to label the government's inaction as a cause of conflict because it did not take action that could have prevented conflict. However, when you take into consideration the intentions and interests behind the Sudanese government's actions, it becomes possible to see the inaction as a stimulus and thus as a cause. It has been arguably clear for some time that the Sudanese government's participation in multilateral negotiations to end the conflict has been largely about prolonging a situation in which genocide can continue unencumbered by the presence of foreign intervenors. By choosing to enter into then drag its feet on the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the intention of ensuring the continuation and exacerbation of conflict-causing factors, it seems that, indeed, the government's inaction can be just as easily seen as an intentional action and thus a potentially important cause. In the same way that the government's policy of providing support to the Janjaweed is a causal stimulus, so too is the government's maintenance of a structure in which its desired outcomes can occur. If we tentatively accept that inaction can in certain cases be studied as a cause, it raises the methodological question of how we identify such causes as distinct from regular instances of inaction that lead to counterfactual arguments. In other words, how do we differentiate between government non-action, which cannot have causal effect, and government policy to not act, which I am arguing can have causal effect. To a certain degree, this may be a question of semantics. We might, for example, re-name the second instance of inaction "government obstructionist behaviour" where an explicit policy stimulates the exacerbation of environmental and economic pressures contributing to conflict. Another important consideration seems to be the intentionality behind inaction: whether it is a policy decision or merely a void. This, however, seems to rest heavily on our ability to know policymakers' intentions. In general I agree with Tad’s comments on Professor DeWaal’s excellent article. However, with respect to the second section of Tad’s first point, it seems that the absolute exclusion of government inaction from consideration as a potential cause of conflict is not as black and white as it appears. In DeWaal’s interesting historical overview, two key instances of inaction are mentioned. The first was an unfulfilled government promise to improve access to water resources for herders in the late 1960s. The failure to implement its promise, DeWaal argues, was partly due to dramatic changes in policy direction by successive governments. Here, the exclusion of this “non-event” as a potential cause holds: to consider the government’s failure to properly manage resources as a necessary cause of the future conflict would be to present a counterfactual argument. We accept that given the complexity of the human-ecological context in which we are conducting analysis, we can not say with any degree of certainty that better government management of water resources would have prevented conflict. Further, as Tad notes, it is also incorrect to consider the instance of inaction as part of the cause of the conflict (or in the terms we have begun to adopt, as an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition) because there is no stimulus to identify as a cause, just a perceived void.

When we look at DeWaal’s next instance of government inaction, however, things seem to become more complicated. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement commits the government to a development policy that would see, among other things, better management of water resources for Arab herders that are currently forced into competition with black farmers. However, the Sudanese government has thus far failed to implement the policy. At first glance it would seem that again it would be incorrect to label the government’s inaction as a cause of conflict because it did not take action that could have prevented conflict. However, when you take into consideration the intentions and interests behind the Sudanese government’s actions, it becomes possible to see the inaction as a stimulus and thus as a cause. It has been arguably clear for some time that the Sudanese government’s participation in multilateral negotiations to end the conflict has been largely about prolonging a situation in which genocide can continue unencumbered by the presence of foreign intervenors. By choosing to enter into then drag its feet on the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the intention of ensuring the continuation and exacerbation of conflict-causing factors, it seems that, indeed, the government’s inaction can be just as easily seen as an intentional action and thus a potentially important cause. In the same way that the government’s policy of providing support to the Janjaweed is a causal stimulus, so too is the government’s maintenance of a structure in which its desired outcomes can occur.

If we tentatively accept that inaction can in certain cases be studied as a cause, it raises the methodological question of how we identify such causes as distinct from regular instances of inaction that lead to counterfactual arguments. In other words, how do we differentiate between government non-action, which cannot have causal effect, and government policy to not act, which I am arguing can have causal effect. To a certain degree, this may be a question of semantics. We might, for example, re-name the second instance of inaction “government obstructionist behaviour” where an explicit policy stimulates the exacerbation of environmental and economic pressures contributing to conflict. Another important consideration seems to be the intentionality behind inaction: whether it is a policy decision or merely a void. This, however, seems to rest heavily on our ability to know policymakers’ intentions.

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